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Industry 4.0 systems are characterized by their high complexity, connectivity and data
exchange. Due to these characteristics, it is critical to ensure condentiality of data.
An often-used mechanism to ensure condentiality is the use of access control. Based
on software architecture modeling, access control can conceptually be applied during
design time of the system, which enables early identication of potential condentiality
issues and the ability to analyze the impact of what-if scenarios on condentiality before
deploying changes. However, uncertainties of the systems environment, which result from
the abstract view of the software architecture model, or ambiguity in the early stages of
development can have an direct eect on existing access control policies, which might
result in reduced condentiality. To mitigate their eect on access control, it is important
to identify and handle these uncertainties.
In this thesis, we present our approach to handle uncertainty in access control during design
time. We dene a characterization of uncertainties in access control on the architectural
level to provide a better understanding and overview of the kinds of uncertainty that are
present. We describe a concept of trust in the validity of access control properties, as a
way to handle uncertainty, that has been described in publications dening or extending
access control models. The concept of trust is a composition of environmental factors that
impact the validity of and consequently trust in access control properties. We propose
the use of fuzzy inference systems as a way of dening how environmental factors are
combined to calculate trust values for each individual access control property. These trust
values are than used by an analysis process to identify issues which can result from a lack
of trust.
We extend an existing data ow diagram approach to design time information ow and
access control analysis with our concept of trust. Our approach of adding knowledge
to a software architecture model and providing a way to analyze model instances for
access control violations shall enable software architects to increase the quality of models
and further verify access control requirements under uncertainty, in early stages of the
software development.
We evaluate the applicability based on the availability of necessary data during dierent
phases of development and the potential value that can be added to existing systems. We
also measure the accuracy of the analysis in identifying issues and the scalability regarding





Industrie 4.0-Systeme zeichnen sich durch ihre hohe Komplexität, Konnektivität und ih-
ren hohen Datenaustausch aus. Aufgrund dieser Eigenschaften ist es entscheidend, eine
Vertraulichkeit der Daten sicher zu stellen. Ein häug verwendetes Verfahren zum Si-
cherstellen von Vertraulichkeit ist das Verwenden von Zugriskontrolle. Basierend auf
modellierter Softwarearchitektur, kann eine Zugriskontrolle bereits während der Ent-
wurfszeit konzeptionell auf das System angewendet werden. Dies ermöglicht es, potentielle
Vertraulichkeitsprobleme bereits früh zu identizieren und bietet die Möglichkeit, die Aus-
wirkungen von Was-wäre-wenn-Szenarien auf die Vertraulichkeit zu analysieren, bevor
entsprechende Änderungen umgesetzt werden. Ungewissheiten der Systemumgebung,
die sich aus Unklarheiten in den frühen Phasen der Entwicklung oder der abstrakten
Sicht des Softwarearchitekturmodells ergeben, können sich jedoch direkt auf bestehende
Zugriskontrollrichtlinien auswirken und zu einer reduzierten Vertraulichkeit führen. Um
dies abzuschwächen, ist es wichtig, Ungewissheiten zu identizieren und zu behandeln.
In dieser Arbeit stellen wir unseren Ansatz zum Umgang mit Ungewissheiten der Zu-
griskontrolle während der Entwurfszeit vor. Wir erstellen eine Charakterisierung von
Ungewissheiten in der Zugriskontrolle auf der Architekturebene, um ein besseres Ver-
ständnis über die existierenden Arten von Ungewissheiten zu erhalten. Darauf basierend
denieren wir ein Konzept des Vertrauens in die Gültigkeit von Eigenschaften der Zu-
griskontrolle. Dieses Konzept bietet die Möglichkeit mit Ungewissheiten umzugehen, die
bereits in Publikationen zu Zugriskontrollmodellen beschrieben wurden. Das Konzept
des Vertrauens ist eine Zusammensetzung von Umgebungsfaktoren, die die Gültigkeit von
und folglich das Vertrauen in Zugriskontrolleigenschaften beeinussen. Um Umgebungs-
faktoren zu kombinieren und so Vertrauenswerte von Zugriskontrolleigenschaften zu
erhalten, nutzen wir Fuzzy-Inferenzsysteme. Diese erhaltenen Vertrauenswerte werden
von einem Analyseprozess mit in Betracht gezogen, um Probleme zu identizieren, die
aus einem Mangel an Vertrauen entstehen.
Wir erweitern einen bestehenden Ansatz zur Analyse von Informationsuss und Zugris-
kontrolle zur Entwurfszeit, basierend auf Datenussdiagrammen. Das Wissen, welches wir
mit unserem Konzept des Vertrauens hinzufügen, soll Softwarearchitekten die Möglichkeit
geben, die Qualität ihrer Modelle zu erhöhen und Anforderungen an die Zugriskontrolle
ihrer Systeme bereits in frühen Phasen der Softwareentwicklung, unter Berücksichtigung
von Ungewissheiten zu verizieren.
Die Anwendbarkeit unseres Ansatzes evaluieren wir anhand der Verfügbarkeit der notwen-
digen Daten in verschiedenen Phasen der Softwareentwicklung, sowie des potenziellen
Mehrwerts für bestehende Systeme. Wir messen die Genauigkeit der Analyse beim Iden-
tizieren von Problemen und die Skalierbarkeit hinsichtlich der Ausführungszeit, wenn
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Organizations always try to optimize and streamline production lines and supply chains
to increase productivity and save costs. To achieve these goals, the use of the concepts
and technologies associated with cyber-physical systems (CPS), the Internet of Things
(IoT), and the Internet of Services (IoS) have steadily increased. This lead to the concept
of Industry 4.0 (I4.0) [60] or Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) [11]. Boyes et al. [11] de-
scribe the IIoT as a system that is comprised of multiple subsystems, including networked
smart objects, cyber-physical assents, and generic information technologies, as well as
optional cloud or edge computing platforms. The interconnected system enables real-time,
intelligent, and autonomous access, collection, analysis, and exchange of process, product,
and/or service information. This way, the overall production value can be optimized. The
production process can be streamlined by implementing self-organizing product lines and
supply chains, with ad-hoc cooperation between the involved machines, humans, and
organizations. For organizations, this may improve product or service delivery, boost
overall productivity, reduce labor cost and energy consumption, as well as reducing the
build-to-order cycle [11].
I4.0 and IIoT systems use and process data of the involved entities as decentralized re-
sources that communicate with each other. As much communication happens with outside
organizations like, for example, suppliers or producers, there is much concern about unau-
thorized access to each other’s data. The high exibility and complexity and the amount
of data exchange of such systems makes it more critical than ever to be able to ensure the
condentiality of data [60].
An often-used measure to ensure this kind of condentiality is using access control mech-
anisms to authorize access or processing of data. Depending on the underlying access
control model, varying information is used to determine whether access should be granted
or denied in a specic scenario. The information is processed by various services, which
provide this information to the access control system. The services that provide this
information to the system introduce an element of uncertainty to the access control that
might implicate reduced validity or condentiality. For example, there are multiple ways
to obtain an employee’s location, each with diering uncertainties: Physical access control
systems can verify the position within a building as soon as the employee enters a room
using his magnet card on an RFID reader. However, an RFID reader cannot know whether
multiple people entered the room at the same time or whether the room has already been
left. A GPS sensor might experience inaccuracies and varying processing delays depending
on satellite reception or signal dampening [33]. Depending on the environment, these
factors can result in a deviation of the position supplied by the GPS sensor of multiple
meters. This deviation causes, e.g., the assignment of a person to a specic room to be
error-prone and reduces the validity of this information. Delays and the general age of
the supplied information might also decrease its validity and increase uncertainty. The
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1 Introduction
exible and distributed property of I4.0 and IIoT systems also introduces uncertainty about
the current system structure, system behavior, and system environment [13]. This is why
uncertainty in access control needs to be considered, especially in the context of I4.0 or
IIoT.
In the following, we present the outline of our contribution and give an overview of the
thesis’ structure.
1.1 Contribution
We propose an approach of narrowing down and handling uncertainty in access control
within the context of design time software architecture modeling of Industry 4.0 systems.
We aim to dene a characterization of uncertainties in access control on the architectural
level, to be able to better understand the kinds of uncertainty that can be present. To do
so, we rst discuss how characteristics of existing uncertainty taxonomies [51], [75] can
be applied to design time software architecture. We further classify properties used in
access control and specic uncertainties that can be associated with these properties.
With this characterization, we aim to identify scenarios in research regarding access
control in which uncertainty is described. We use these scenarios to further narrow down
the characterization of uncertainty and dene a way to handle the inuence of uncertainty
on access control. Using our approach shall enable software architects of I4.0 systems to
not only analyze the validity of data-ow criteria based on xed access control information
but also to factor in uncertainties of the system and its environment.
As part of this thesis, we aim to answer the following research questions:
RQ1 Which kinds of uncertainty exist in access control on the architectural level, and
how do these uncertainties manifest themselves?
RQ2 How can the uncertainty be handled in access control analyses on the architectural
level?
We answer RQ1 by creating the characterization of uncertainties in access control on the
architectural level, we have described above.
To answer RQ2, we make model uncertainty explicit by dening the concept trust as
a composition of environmental factors of the system that inuence the correctness or
validity of access control properties. We extend an existing data ow based software
architecture analysis approach with this concept [66].
1.2 Outline
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: In Chapter 2, we explain our founda-
tions, like uncertainty classication, data ow modeling, and fuzzy inference systems. In
Chapter 3, we present related work regarding uncertainty in software and access control, as
well as analysis of architectural models. We elaborate our characterization of uncertainty
in the I4.0 environment, in Chapter 4, narrowing down and combining several views
2
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on uncertainty in software architecture and access control. In Chapter 5 we present a
running example that we use throughout the remainder of the thesis. Chapter 6 gives a
detailed overview of the extension to a data ow model to include the concept of trust.
We explain how we utilize the extended data ow model by extending an existing access
control analysis approach in Chapter 7. In Chapter 8 we evaluate our approach. Chapter 9




This chapter gives an overview of the foundations the contributions of this thesis are
based on. Section 2.1 covers the uncertainty characterization that we discuss in this thesis,
which strongly bases on the taxonomy of uncertainty for software systems [51] and the
general denition of uncertainty [75], that the taxonomy bases on. The implementation
of our concept relies on two main foundations. Section 2.2 covers the data ow diagram
approach [66], which builds our foundation for a data ow denition and analysis. In
Section 2.3 we explain the fundamentals of fuzzy logic and fuzzy inference systems (FIS),
which we utilize as part of our contribution.
2.1 Uncertainty Classification
One of the most prominent publications regarding uncertainty is the paper "Dening
Uncertainty" from Walker et al. [75]. They describe a terminology and typology and a
three-dimensional uncertainty matrix for identifying and characterizing uncertainty. The
three dimensions of uncertainty are the location, level, and nature. The location indicates
where the uncertainty manifests itself within the observed system. They dene some
generic locations that apply to most models. These locations are Context uncertainty,
model structure uncertainty, model technical uncertainty, parameter uncertainty, and
model outcome uncertainty. The level of uncertainty is dependent on the knowledge about
uncertainty. It raises with an increase of uncertainty and a decrease of knowledge about
the uncertainty. The level terminology is structured as follows: Determinism, statistical
uncertainty, scenario uncertainty, recognized ignorance, and total ignorance. Nature is
divided into uncertainty, resulting from the imperfection of knowledge (epistemic) or
inherent variability present in a system, e.g., through human behavior or random events in
nature (aleatory). The taxonomy of Perez-Palacin and Mirandola [51] is heavily based on
Uncertainty
location level nature
0: lack of uncertainty
1: lack of knowledge
2: lack of awareness






Figure 2.1: Uncertainty taxonomy of Perez-Palacin et al [51].
5
2 Foundations
the three dimensions of the uncertainty matrix of [75], but coin them to be more focused
on software engineering. This three-dimension classication is shown in Figure 2.1. They
narrow down the originally very open denition of the locations to be specic to software
systems. Instead of the progressive transition of levels proposed by [75], they propose a
scale of ve clearly dened levels of uncertainty, based on the ve orders of ignorance [3].
Nature is dened slightly dierently, but the overall proposition remains unchanged.
2.2 Data Flow Diagrams
The data ow diagram (DFD) approach of Seifermann et al. [66] is based on the DFD
notion of DeMarco [18]. They propose an extension of the DFD syntax to overcome several
limitations regarding the usability for condentiality analyses.
Instances of the extended DFD are analyzed using a logic program given in Prolog [12].
The DFD instance is rst transformed to Prolog facts and rules, which dene the structure
of the DFD and relationships between structural entities. These facts and rules are later
used to dene queries used to identify possibly illegal data ows.
2.2.1 Extended Data Flow Diagram
Data ow diagrams are unidirectional graphs representing the viewpoint on systems based
on data processing. The extended DFD metamodel is shown in Figure 2.2 and is made up
of several elements:
Graph Nodes are either Actors, Processes, Stores or ActorProcesses. Edges that connect Nodes
are called Data ows and describe a data transmission between the connected nodes.
Actors are source and sink nodes, which start or terminate a sequence of data ows.
In Process nodes, incoming data is transformed and passed on as outgoing data. The
ActorProcess nodes describe complex data processing on behalf of an actor. Store nodes
hold or emit data.
Characteristics represent properties of nodes. Each Characteristic is an instance of a
CharacteristicType. This strong typing of Characteristic makes it possible to identify and
match properties of the same type. The value of a property can be one out of a set of
discrete values. These sets are represented by an Enumeration and the discrete values
are represented by Label. Each CharacteristicType denes a Enumeration as the range of
possible values for properties of the corresponding type. A Characteristic selects a subset
of available labels from its type. Each node can hold multiple Characteristics. This means,
that a Node has the properties that correspond to the labels of its held Characteristics.
A Pin describes required input data or output data of a node. The entirety of Pins of a Node
represents the interface of the Node. Instead of connecting Nodes, the DataFlow edges
connect output pins to input pins. Using Pins lowers the modeling eort by enabling the
reuse of nodes. An additional edge from an input pin represents an alternative data ow.
An additional edge to an output pin represents another forked data ow.
The way Nodes manipulate and transform data is represented by BehaviorDenitions. A
BehaviorDenition consists of input and output pins and Assignments. The Terms of an
6
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Assignment describe how labels are assigned to output pins. This assignment can refer to











































Figure 2.2: Metamodel of DFD with condentiality extensions [66].
2.2.2 Transformation to Logic Program
As shown in Figure 2.2, actors, stores, processes, and actor processes are subclasses of
node. Each node is transformed to one Prolog fact, which corresponds to its actual type,
replacing the placeholder variable N in Line 1 of Listing 2.1 with the identier of the
node. For actor processes, the placeholder variable A is replaced by the identier of the
corresponding actor. Characteristic types are transformed by creating a fact as shown in
line 2 of Listing 2.1, replacing CT with the identier of the characteristic type. For each
label of the enumeration, which the characteristic type refers to, a fact as shown in line 3
of Listing 2.1 is created. CT is replaced by the identier of the characteristic type, V with
the identier of the actual label, and I with the position of the label in the enumeration.
Each label that is assigned to a node becomes one fact by replacing the N in line 4 of Listing
7
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2.1 with the identier of the node, CT with the identier of the characteristic type and V
with the identier of the assigned label.
Listing 2.1: Prolog facts representing the DFD structure [66].
1 actor(N), store(N), process(N), actorProcess(N, A),
2 characteristicType(CT),
3 characteristicTypeValue(CT, V, I),
4 nodeCharacteristic(N, CT, V).
Facts are created for every input and output pin of each node, by replacing N in line 1
of Listing 2.2 with the identier of the corresponding node and PIN with the identier
of the pin. Data ows are transformed to facts, shown line 2 of Listing 2.2. F is replaced
by the identier of the data ow, N_SRC and PIN_SRC are replaced by the identiers
of the source node and pin, N_DST and PIN_DST are replaced by the identiers of the
destination node and pin. As behavior is specied for a pin of a node, we replace the
variables N and PIN, of the rule shown in line 3 of Listing 2.2, with the identiers of the
pin and corresponding node. The rule body is created in a way, that it evaluates to true,
if the value label V of characteristic type CT is available on the pin PIN of node N. S
represents a ow tree, that will be traversed, VF represents a list of all ows that have
already been traversed. [66]
Listing 2.2: Prolog facts and rule representing node behaviors [66].
1 inputPin(N, PIN), outputPin(N, PIN),
2 dataflow(F, N_SRC, PIN_SRC, N_DST, PIN_DST),
3 characteristic(N, PIN, CT, V, S, VF) :- ...
2.2.3 Analysis
The analysis is dened with a query to the Prolog program. Prolog automatically tries
to solve the query and by doing so considers all data paths via backtracking. For access
control, the queries compare labels of the nodes receiving data with labels of the received
data, or labels of data to each other.
The Prolog clauses that can be used to dene analysis queries are the union of the Prolog
facts and rules described in the previous section and additional helper clauses. Line 1 of
Listing 2.1 shows the clauses to nd an identier N representing one of the node types
described in Section 2.2.1. Lines 2 and 3 of show clauses to nd the identier CT of a
characteristic type and the label identier V of characteristic type CT. Line 4 of shows the
clause to nd the label identier V of characteristic type CT that is active on the node with
identier N.
Line 1 in Listing 2.2 shows clauses to nd an identier PIN for either input or output pins
of a node with identier N. Line 2 shows the clause to nd an identier F of a data ow,
that connects the pin with identier PIN_SRC of the node with identier N_SRC to the
pin with identier PIN_DST of the node with identier N_DST. Line 3 Listing 2.2 shows
the clause to nd the label identier V of characteristic type CT that is available on the
pin with identier PIN of the node with identier N.
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Line 1 in Listing 2.3 shows the clause to nd all input pins PINS for a given node with
identier N. Line 2 shows the clause to build a valid ow tree S for the pin with identier
PIN of the node with identier N. Line 3 shows the clause to nd out if the node with
identier N has been traversed by the ow tree S.
Using these clauses dierent queries can be tailored to t dierent policy types.
Listing 2.3: Helper clauses for analysis queries [66].
1 findAllInputPins(N, PINS),
2 flowTree(N, PIN, S),
3 traversedNode(S, N).
2.3 Fuzzy Inference Systems
Fuzzy Inference Systems (FIS) use fuzzy set theory to map system inputs to outputs. The
Mamdani fuzzy inference system [43] that we use in this thesis was initially developed
to control the steam engine and boiler combination. FISs are used for several use cases,
including handwriting recognition, prediction systems for early recognition of earthquakes
[5] and as adaptive-network-based fuzzy inference systems (ANFIS) [35] in the eld of
articial neural networks and machine learning [68], [74].
A FIS is made up of four main components [14], [39], [50], shown in Figure 2.3:
• A fuzzier, which translates the crisp inputs to the system into fuzzy values, by
applying the real-valued crisp input values to a set of membership functions.
• A fuzzy inference engine, which uses the fuzzy input from the fuzzier and available
fuzzy rules to infer a fuzzy output.
• A defuzzier, which translates the fuzzy output of the inference engine back to a
crisp value, by aggregating the fuzzy outputs using a defuzzication method.
• A knowledge base, which comprises a collection of fuzzy rules, the rule base, and a













Figure 2.3: Basic structure of a FIS [50].
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In the fuzzier, the crisp numerical inputs to the system are assigned to fuzzy sets. This
assignment is represented by a degree of membership within an interval of [0,1]. The
degree of membership value represents the degree of truth that the input value belongs
to the fuzzy set. These fuzzy sets are dened by their respective membership function,
which calculates the degree of membership for a given value.
Referencing natural language, each input represents a linguistic concept used to abstract
from the actual crisp inputs. The membership functions represent the linguistic values of
the corresponding concept. For example, rainfall might be measured by the number of
liters per square meter. This measurement is the crisp input. A linguistic concept might be
the Heaviness of Rain [46]. Figure 2.4 shows the exemplary fuzzy input for the heaviness
of rain, depending on the amount of rainfall in liters per square meter. The linguistic
values might be lite, medium, or heavy rain. Three corresponding fuzzy sets are dened
by the membership functions lite, medium and heavy. A crisp value of 7.5 liters of
rain, results in degrees of truth of 0.2 for lite, 0.55 for medium and 0.0 for heavy.
0 5 10 15 20 25






















Figure 2.4: Linguistic concept ’heaviness of rain’, with exemplary linguistic values.
While the fuzzy sets in Figure 2.4 are dened by gaussian functions, in general any fuzzy
set  can be dened by a function ` over a discrete universe - with the mapping rule
` : - → [0, 1] [76].
Fuzzy rules which characterize the behavior of the fuzzy inference engine, are a set of
linguistic description rules. The rules are structured in the form IF (a set of conditions are
satised) THEN (a set of consequences can be inferred). For a FIS with two inputs and
one output a rule is structured like this:
IF 0 8B 8 0=3 1 8B 8 THEN I 8B /8 .
Here a and b are inputs structured similar to the example input in Figure 2.4, 8 , 8 and /8
are fuzzy sets or membership functions, from each respective input/output. This rule is
10
2.3 Fuzzy Inference Systems
implemented by a fuzzy implication '8 , which is dened as
'8 (D, E,F) = [8 (D) 0=3 8 (E)] → /8 (F).
The logical connection 0=3 , and corresponding >A , can be implemented by a variety of
functions. The Fuzzy Logic Toolbox in MATLAB [44] and the ISO IEC 61131 standard
regarding fuzzy control programming [34] dene the min operator of Mamdani (MIN), the
product (PROD), and the bounded dierence (BDIF) for the logical 0=3 . For the logical >A ,
the max operator of Mamdani (MAX), the algebraic sum (ASUM), and the bounded sum
(BSUM) are dened. The corresponding formulas are presented in Table 2.1. For Mamdani
FISs, the default implementation is the MIN operator ∧. This results in




BDIF <0G (0, = +< − 1)
Or Operator
MAX <0G (=,<)
ASUM = +< − = ·<
BSUM <8=(1, = +<)
Table 2.1: Operators that can be used for the logical connection in rules. [34]
Multiple rules of this kind might be dened. To obtain the fuzzy output, the fuzzy inference
engine utilizes the given fuzzy inputs 00 and 10 to calculate the consequent fuzzy output
/ . / (F) is calculated by accumulating the result of the fuzzy implications of each rule:
/ (F) = 22D (1(00) ∧ 1(10) → /1(F), ..., = (00) ∧ = (10) → /= (F)) ∀F ∈,
Similar to logical connections 0=3 and >A , MATLAB [44] and the ISO IEC 61131 standard
[34] dene the max operator of Mamdani (MAX), the bounded sum (BSUM) and the
normalized sum (NSUM) as operators for 22D. The corresponding formulas are presented
in Table 2.2. For Mamdani FIS 22D is dened as the MAX operator ∨.
/ (F) = /1(F) ∨ ... ∨ /= (F) =<0G{/1(F), ..., /= (F)}
Accu Operator
Mamdani max MAX <0G (=,<)




Table 2.2: Accumulation methods. [34]
In the defuzzier, the calculated fuzzy output / is translated back to a crisp value I0. This
is done by utilizing a defuzzication operator: I0 = 34 5 DII8 5 84A (/ ). Fuller et al. [24]
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dene the center of gravity (COG), center of area (COA), left most max (LM) and right
most max (RM) as defuzzication operators. The corresponding formulas are presented in
Table 2.3.
Defuzziaction Method






center of area COA
∑
9 G 9/ (G 9 )∑
9 / (G 9 )
left most max LM <8={G |/ (G) =<0GF (/ (F))}
right most max RM <0G{G |/ (G) =<0GF (/ (F))}
Table 2.3: Calculation rules for the defuzzication process. [24]
Figure 2.5 shows the process of making inferences with a multiple-input-single-output
(MISO) FIS, in this case two-input-single-output. The shown example uses the Mamdani
min and max operators for the logical and connection and aggregation. For defuzzication,


















Figure 2.5: Inferences with Mamdani’s min, max operators and GOG defuzzication [24].
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In this chapter, we give an overview of the related work of this thesis. We split the related
work into two areas of research. In Section 3.1, we discuss dierent areas where uncertainty
has been researched and distinguish our contribution from approaches in these areas. We
also discuss related work regarding the design-time analysis of software architectures,
describe dierent existing approaches, and dierentiate our contribution of this thesis
from these approaches in Section 3.2.
3.1 Uncertainty
The related work presented in this section focuses on uncertainty in various research
areas that are partly related to the contribution of this thesis. In Section 3.1.1 we present
related work in the area of design-time uncertainty. Section 3.1.2 gives an overview of
multiple approaches that address uncertainty in access control. In Section 3.1.3 we present
three related publications in the topic of uncertainty and cyber-physical systems. Finally,
in Section 3.1.4 we present related work that uses fuzzy systems to handle or represent
uncertainty in the context of access control.
3.1.1 Uncertainty During Design-Time
Lytra and Zdun [41] propose a fuzzy logic-based approach for architectural design decision
making to provide automated guidance for recurring architectural design decisions under
uncertainty. They create a DSL for specifying decision models with uncertainty and
implement a fuzzy inference system for deriving best-tting design solutions.
Famelis and Chechik [21] propose a methodological approach for managing uncertainty
using partial models. They work out stages in the lifecycle of uncertainty-related design
decisions and encapsulate abstracted information of the lifecycle of design-time uncertainty
in software artifacts in the so-called Design-Time Uncertainty Management (DeTUM)
model.
Both approaches provide a good base understanding of uncertainty during design-time
but primarily focus on uncertainty in the structure and input of the software system. The
characteristic of uncertainty in the system context, as described in Section 2.1, is not
regarded.
3.1.2 Uncertainty in Access Control
Hengartner and Ge [29] present an access control model that addresses challenges that
arise when deploying uncertainty-aware access control. They dene these challenges as
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identifying and authenticating people and their intended actions, associating uncertainty
with time, and handling similar/redundant uncertain statements.
Bures et al. [13] present access-control related situational patterns for tackling uncertainty
in a system. They provide a classication and representative examples of uncertainty in
access control in Industry 4.0 systems. the situational patterns are based on the classica-
tion and are aimed to serve as meta-adaptation strategies in unanticipated situations.
While we use many aspects of these approaches for our proposed concept, they only focus
on representing uncertainty present at runtime.
3.1.3 Uncertainty Associated with Cyber-Physical Systems
There are multiple publications of Zhang et al. that revolve around the topic of uncertainty
and cyber-physical systems (CPS). The rst publication [79] denes the uncertainty which
is inherent in situations where CPS might interact with environmental factors like humans.
Other publications focus on testing and test generation [77][78], which leverage the
uncertainty of its operating environment to ensure its reliable operation.
While CPS generally ts in the theme of I4.0, the uncertainty involving the environment
and operation of CPS shows no direct relation to the theme of uncertainty in access control
of I4.0 systems.
3.1.4 Using Fuzzy Logic
Several fuzzy logic approaches describe how to handle uncertainty. In the realm of access
control, we found an approach of Hosmer [30] that uses fuzzy logic to represent security
patterns. Cheng et al. [15] use the inherent uncertainty and risk in access control decisions
to create a fuzzy logic risk-adaptive access control model. They illustrate their approach
by showing how it could be used to implement a fuzzy multi-level-security model.
The work of Platenius et al. [52], [53] uses fuzzy logic to match service requests to
potentially incomplete service specications using signature or privacy policy matching.
Similar to the approach of Lytra and Zdun [41] the fuzzy logic approaches focus on making
decisions by factoring in uncertainty. This thesis, however, mainly focuses on representing
uncertainty in the software architecture and providing a process to analyze the eect of
uncertainty on access control during design time.
3.2 Analyses of Soware Architecture and Security
The related work presented in this section focuses on approaches of analyzing software
architecture or security analysis which are partly related to our contribution. We rst
describe the Palladio approach of software architecture modeling and simulation in Section
3.2.1. In Section 3.2.2 we present an approach of model driven security analysis. Section
3.2.3 gives an overview of several data ow modeling and analysis approaches. In Section
3.2.4 we present two analysis approaches which base on source code. We conclude this
section in Section 3.2.4 with a comparison of all the presented approaches and compare
them to our contribution.
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3.2.1 Palladio
Palladio is a tool-supported software architecture simulation approach used to predict an
architecture’s Quality of Software properties, like performance or reliability.
The Palladio Component Model (PCM) is a metamodel of component-based software
architectures [59]. The basic PCM consists of a repository, system, resource environment,
allocation, and usage metamodel, each representing a dierent architectural view on a
system.
The repository model describes components and their interfaces, with the inner behavior
of components being described by service eect specications (SEFF). The system model
combines components that are described in the repository model to specify the software
architecture. The resource environment model describes the specications of available
processing resources. The allocation model describes which components are deployed
on which resource. The usage model describes the behavior of users interacting with the
system [59].
There are multiple approaches to analyzing PCM model instances. The most prominent
is the method of simulation for performance predictions during the design process [7].
Another analysis method has been presented by Koziolek et al. [40], transforming the
PCM to layered queueing networks (LQN) and using an LQN solver. This approach gives a
performance advantage over the previously described discrete-time simulations, but results
need to be interpreted manually. A dierent simulation approach has been proposed by
Meier et al. [47]. The approach provides an automated model-to-model transformation
that transforms PCM model instances to queuing petri nets (QPN). The modeled system is
then analyzed by simulating the resulting QPN.
All of the before mentioned approaches based on the Palladio Component Model (PCM)
focus on performance prediction during design time and not access control.
In previous work, Seifermann et al. propose a software architecture description and
analysis process, called Data-Driven Software Architecture (DDSA) [65]. The approach
extends the PCM and utilizes the control ow derived from a PCM instance for access
control analysis. They introduce the concept of data and data processing operators as
rst-class entities to the PCM. Data can have sets of characteristics, which represent
abstract meta-data of the aliated data [64]. The analysis is realized as queries to a Prolog
program that a transformation chain derives from the extended PCM instances. While
the DDSA approach can analyze a software architecture model instance for access control
violations, the focus of the access control analysis is on the control ow and not the more
ne granular ow of data.
3.2.2 Model-Driven Security Modeling
Model-driven security approaches try to solve security questions during design time.
Similar to the Palladio approach described in Section 3.2.1, modeling and analysis of
critical security aspects in the early stages of the system development process can prevent
more cost-intensive changes in subsequent stages.
Jürjens et al. describe an approach which is based on Unied Modeling Language (UML),
called UMLSec [36]. With the use of stereotypes and constraints, standard UML diagrams
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are annotated with security attributes. Model instances with those security attributes are
transformed into abstract state machines and analyzed with a model checking approach.
The approach supports analyses of information ow and access control in the form of
RBAC policies. While the proposed information ow analysis considers data, the RBAC
access control analysis only considers actions.
3.2.3 Data FlowModeling
Additional to the data ow diagram approach of Seiferman et al. [66], which we have
described in Section 2.2, there are several other data ow oriented security analysis
approaches.
Katkalov et al. propose an environment for modeling ow-sensitive applications, called
IFlow [38]. Similar to the UMLSec approach, an annotated UML diagram is transformed
into an abstract state machine. The resulting machine is then used as an input for theorem
proving. The goals are automatically generated based on annotations by the user. To
realize an information ow analysis, IFlow requires behavior descriptions, which are very
detailed and are challenging to properly create during design time [66], [73].
Peldszus et al. present an approach using an annotated architectural level data ow diagram
model, called SecDFD [49]. They propose a mapping between DFD and a codebase, which
includes the matching of structures and signatures. The mapping can be used to apply
security metrics as a form of compliance check.
The FlowUML approach of Alghathbar et al. [1] is a "logic-based system to validate
information ow policies at the requirements specication phase of UML based designs
[1]." The approach derives DFDs from UML sequence diagrams and maps them in a logic
program. They describe how to create policies that can detect violations in information ow
and access control. However, the access control policies are limited to the Discretionary
Access Control (DAC) and Mandatory Access Control (MAC) models. Also, at the time of
writing this thesis, there exist no publications that report on an evaluation of FlowUML.
3.2.4 Source Code Confidentiality Analysis
When focusing on security analysis, there also are multiple approaches revolving around
the topic of source code condentiality analysis. As the eld is very big, we only present
two dierent approaches as our related work.
The generic information ow analysis JOANA of Snelting et al. [72] supports agging of
data and the use of multiple security levels.
More specied approaches, like the FlowDroid approach of Arzt, Steven, et al. present
a static source code analysis for Android applications [4]. They utilize the technique of
’tainting’ data to track sensitive information through an application.
While both approaches can detect violations in information ows, they can only be used
in a later development phase when source code is already available. At this time in the
development process, the approaches can detect the eect of a design issue, but do not
reveal the design issue itself [66].
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3.2.5 Comparison
We add Table 3.1 to better summarize the comparison and describe our reasoning in using
the DFD approach of Seifermann et al. (see Section 2.2) as the base for our contribution.
The Palladio and DDSA approaches only focus on the control ow. Even though DDSA
allows for access control, it is not dened on the data level. The IFlow and SecDFD
approaches focus on information ow but do not provide the possibility of dening
access control policies. While the UMLsec and FlowUML approaches generally allow for
the denition of access control policies, they come with many restrictions and are not
universally applicable. The approaches regarding source code analysis fall out of the scope
for our contribution, as we aim to focus on the design time software architecture.
The DFD approach of Seifermann et al. (see Section 2.2), oers access control analysis
on the data level, during design time. The denition of access control policies is also not
restricted, like the UMLsec and FlowUML approaches, and is able to dene access control




Palladio design time control ow analytical solver
& simulation
DDSA design time control ow &
access control
logic program
UMLsec design time information ow
(& access control)
model checking
IFlow design time information ow theorem proving
SecDFD design time information ow theorem proving
FlowUML design time information ow
(& access control)
logic program
FlowDroid implementation information ow static taint analysis
JOANA implementation information ow static code analysis
Contribution
(based on 2.2)
design time information ow
& access control
logic program





In this chapter, we discuss how uncertainty can be characterized. In Section 4.1 we narrow
down an existing characterization of uncertainty to t the area of software architecture.
We further narrow down our characterization with regards to access control in Section 4.2
by conducting a preliminary literature research regarding access control properties and
discussing how some publications already consider uncertainty in dierent ways. Based
on our research, we dene our concept of trust in the validity of an access control property
to handle the observed uncertainty in Section 4.3.
4.1 Uncertainty in Soware Architectures
To characterize and discuss the uncertainty in access control on the architectural layer, we
rst need to establish a general characterization of uncertainty in software architecture
modeling and software architecture analysis. We base our characterization on the classi-
cation of Perez-Palacin, and Mirandola [51], described in Section 2.1.
To narrow down this classication and characterize uncertainty in software architecture,
we rst analyze if the characteristics are applicable in the context of software architecture:
Level: Level 0 uncertainty, or lack of uncertainty establishes a theoretical base for the
level characteristic of uncertainties and exists in every system. A system that only has
level 0 uncertainties is equivalent to a deterministic system without uncertainties. Any
software architecture analysis approach can already cover this kind of uncertainty if no
uncertainty exists in the system.
Level 1 uncertainty, or lack of knowledge is uncertainty that one is aware of but is not
resolvable to level 0 due to missing knowledge. Considering software architecture, if
there is awareness about uncertainty, it might be possible to gather the information
related to the uncertainty and add it to the software architecture. A software architecture
analysis process can use this added information to gain knowledge and mitigate the
uncertainty. However, during design time, the software architecture might still be made
up of assumptions, approximations, or averages which are uncertainties in themselves.
Additionally, uncertainties that one is not aware of might still be present, so fully reducing
the uncertainty to level 0 is not universally possible.
To consider and consequently handle uncertainty in an analysis on the architectural level, it
needs to be treated as a rst-class entity and explicitly represented. To have a representation
of something in a model, one needs to be aware of its existence. Uncertainties on levels 2,
lack of awareness, and 3, lack of process, exist in a system because there is no awareness
about the uncertainty or no known process to gain awareness of that uncertainty. This




Location: The taxonomy of Perez-Palacin and Mirandola [51] is already focused on the
modeling of software systems, so the locations of the taxonomy can directly be applied to
software architecture. Context uncertainty concerns the completeness of the metamodel
that is used to create a software architecture with respect to the real world. Model structural
uncertainty concerns how accurately the structure of the software architecture represents
the modeled subset of the real world. Input parameter uncertainty is associated with the
uncertainty about the actual value of variables given as input to the software architecture.
Nature: Both natures, epistemic and aleatory, can be present in software architecture.
However, aleatory uncertainty, due to the inherent variability of parts of the system or
random events, can not be reduced with an analysis approach, as this kind of randomness
can always occur. Epistemic uncertainty can be reduced by collecting more precise data
about the system and analyzing the improved software architecture.
4.2 Uncertainty in Access Control
To further narrow down the kinds of uncertainty relevant to an architectural access control
analysis for Industry 4.0, we aggregate relevant access control properties from the literature.
We utilize these properties to further narrow down the uncertainty characteristics that we
focus on in this thesis.
4.2.1 Access Control Properties for Industry 4.0
When observing an I4.0 software system and its environment, many properties could be
considered for access control. To get an overview about which access control properties
might be used and in how far they can experience uncertainty, we conduct preliminary
literature research to nd access control properties that are well documented or researched.
Our research suggested that the subject area of access control is extensive while at the
same time yielding only minimal information regarding actual access control properties,
especially with a focus on industrial applications like I4.0 or IIoT systems. This is why
we decided to widen our view and focus on well-documented access control properties in
general.
From preliminary work [10] we already know the concepts of role-based access control
(RBAC) and Organization Based Access Control (OrBAC). We also know that location
information can be used to express access control rules or requirements. Using this
knowledge as our base, we explored research regarding these three main types of properties.
The characteristic of a property can dier within the same property type. For example,
the location can specify the position within the perimeter of a production plant or the
country/city geolocation. The location information can originate from various sources,
like GPS-Sensors, but can also be derived from IP-address resolution. Within a chosen
access control model, similar properties can also be represented in entirely dierent ways.
We chose the presented publications because they directly focus on the access control
property and not only the access control model. Many of the presented publications go
into detail on how a property is obtained and what characteristics make up the property.
Some publications go as far and to describe a kind of uncertainty that can coincide with
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the characteristics of the presented access control property. We explicitly do not list the
property of current time and attempted action, as we did not nd sucient publications
specically addressing these properties or the uncertainty that might come with them.
We categorize the identied access control properties by the information they are based
on. Properties that we can identify are:
4.2.1.1 (Geo-)Location
Ardagna et al. [2] dene an approach to Location-Based Access Control (LBAC). This
access control model only uses location-based conditions and predicates to dene access
control policies. The model considers the limitations of technology by including condence
and timeout values of the location providing services.
Ray et al. [58] extend the Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model to incorporate locations
and show how location information can be used to determine whether a subject has access
to a given object. They formalize their model using the Z specication language [71].
Damiani et al., which proposes an extension of the RBAC model, has suggested a similar
approach, enhanced with spatial-and location-based information.
Skandhakumar et al. [70] propose a graph theoretic representation of building information
models (BIM) that can be used to improve access control administration.
We additionally identied some more general approaches to access control that use the
location as a minor matter, or in examples [16], [29], [57].
4.2.1.2 Roles
Role-based Access Control (RBAC) has been covered by multiple publications [22], [23],
[63]. Permissions are associated with roles, and roles are assigned to users, thereby
acquiring the roles’ permissions. This reduces the complexity and cost of setting up large-
scale authorization management.
As RBAC and roles are a well known concept in the eld of access control, roles are often
used in examples of related publications [17], [29], [32], [57], [58].
4.2.1.3 Organizational Ailiation
The Organization-based Access Control (OrBAC) model, suggested by Kalam et al. [37],
extends the RBAC model by introducing the concept of organizations and contexts. Organi-
zations are a set of subjects, e.g., users or other organizations. Contexts are used to specify
the concrete circumstances or conditions in which specic permissions are granted.
The organizational aliation is also considered in the denition of ABAC [32] and access
control models for cloud computing systems [42], [62].
4.2.2 Trust in Access Control Properties
In the publication "Guide to Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) Denition and Con-
siderations [32]" of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Hu et al.
describe the trust chain of ABAC, regarding the attributes used to make access control
decisions. Trust chains help determine the ownership of information and services and
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requirements for technical solutions to validate and enforce trust relationships. The predi-
cate of a trust relationship revolves around the idea that the access control system can
trust the validity or correctness of the information, e.g., attributes supplied by the owner,
e.g., an authorization service. Depending on the access control model, many trust relation-
ships are required to achieve a properly working access control system. In a subsequent
publication regarding ABAC, Hu et al. dene levels of attribute assurance (LOAA) [31].
An LOAA combines the Accuracy, Integrity and Availability properties of attributes which
are supplied via the described trust chains to give an approximation about the assurance
that the access control system has a valid attribute at its disposal.
Considering RBAC, there might be dierent services that verify a particular role of a user,
see Section 4.2.1.2. Depending on the kind of service, the trust in a supplied role might be
higher, e.g., using face recognition, or lower, e.g., using magnet cards. This is similar to
the condence value of dierent location services described in [2]. A condence value
that a location service can guarantee is composed by combining accuracy, environmental
and weather conditions, requested location, and measurement technique.
This trust in attributes is crucial for Industry 4.0 software systems, as these systems are
often comprised of many subsystems and might even span multiple organizations, as we
described in the introduction 1. If, for example, a technician of another organization is
called in, the trust in the role of technician needs to be deliberated, as the owner of that
information is the other organization.
4.2.3 Environmental Factors
Interpreting the research regarding access control properties we have already done in
Section 4.2.1, we assume that uncertainty of the environment of the system has a signicant
impact on access control. For example, the condence value dened by Ardagna et al. [2] is
dependent on the service and environmental conditions. The condence can be considered
as the certainty in the location’s validity, which depends on environmental factors. The
spatial context denition of Cuppens et al. [16] precisely combines the hardware and
software architecture and the environment as an additional condition for access control.
Based on the work of Hengartner and Ge [29], and Bures et al. [13] we can identify
environmental factors that inuence the uncertainty in access control. These factors are
generally applicable to all access control properties we have identied in Section 4.2.1.
They also align well with the idea of trust relationships we discuss in Section 4.2.2 and
can be represented in software architecture:
• Source of the information
• Age of the information
• Amount of redundant information
In big and distributed systems, such as I4.0 systems, multiple services might exist and
use dierent sources to deliver similar information that the access control properties are
relying on. Location information, for example, might be derived from a physical access
control mechanism or GPS data. Each of these sources has a dierent margin of error
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or accuracy. The physical access control mechanism might verify that a person is in a
particular room, even though he only opened the door and never entered. The GPS, on the
other hand, has varying accuracy that might be dependent on environmental inuences,
as we discussed in the introduction.
The age of the information is a combination of the time it took for a service to gather the
information and for that information to be processed to an access control property and
the overall time that has passed since this access control property has been created. With
an increase in age, the uncertainty rises. For example, the processing time of a GPS sensor
might increase if satellite reception is not optimal. The location of a moving person might
have changed signicantly at the time the processing has nished.
The amount of redundant information could either increase or decrease uncertainty.
Location information from a physical access control system using magnet cards and GPS
location information can either decrease the uncertainty if they complement and verify
each other or increase uncertainty if the information is conicting. Using redundant
information to make access control decisions violates monotonicity [8] or opens up the
possibility for Sybil attacks [19]. Monotonicity in access control ensures that, given a set
of access control properties grants access, a superset of this set will not deny access [8].
This means that uncertainty can only be decreased and not increased when combining
redundant information. A Sybil attack exploits monotonicity by creating a lot of similar
information that complements each other. Even if each information has high uncertainty,
by verifying each other, the combined uncertainty could be decreased to the point of being
suciently low for somebody to be granted access [29].
To further narrow down our view on uncertainty and how it can impact architectural
access control analysis, we need to discuss how to classify these environmental factors
regarding the uncertainty taxonomy of Perez-Palacin, and Mirandola [51]. We have already
narrowed down the taxonomy to be more compliant with software architecture modeling
and software architecture analysis in Section 4.1. Bures et al. [13] suggest a variation on
the uncertainty taxonomy of Perez-Palacin and Mirandola [51], to classify uncertainty
in access control, mainly changing the denition of the location property. They dene
the location of system environment as a combination of the context in which the system
is executed and the input data for the system, which ts the identied environmental
factors. This denition aligns with the context and input parameter location dened by
Perez-Palacin and Mirandola.
Combining the discussion about uncertainty in software architecture, in Section 4.1, with
the uncertainty regarding access control, we narrow down the kind of uncertainty we
aim to mitigate as a contribution of this thesis. Figure 4.1 shows a version of the original
taxonomy, with our narrowed-down view of uncertainty highlighted.
4.3 Uncertainty of Trust
By researching uncertainty in software architecture and access control in this chapter,
we became aware that uncertainty in the validity of access control properties exists. By
gaining this awareness, we reduce the level 2 uncertainty related to the described validity
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Figure 4.1: Highlighted uncertainty taxonomy.
handle this level 1 uncertainty, by using software architecture modeling and analysis, as
described in Section 4.1.
To handle the uncertainty, we add the concept of trust in the validity of access control
properties to an already existing software architecture model and access control analysis
on the architectural level. We dene trust as a composition of the environmental factors
described in Section 4.2.3. The trust in an access control property is generally similar to
the condence level of location services described by Ardagna et al. [2]. The condence
level depends on the extent to which given environmental factors aect the validity of the
individual location services. However, our concept of trust will be applied to all services
that supply information used for access control while additionally taking the actual source
and age of the information into account (see Section 4.2.3).
We extend the data ow approach described in Section 2.2, as it already oers a data
ow model to represent software architecture and an automated analysis that can be
used to detect access violations. By extending the DFD model syntax with the concept
of trust, we include context uncertainty into the software architecture and enable a closer
representation of the real world. As each of the environmental factors that inuence the
trust in a service needs to be represented, the number of input parameters of the model
increases, consequently increasing the input parameter uncertainty.
We reckon that an analysis approach can more easily address input parameter uncertainty
by executing multiple analysis runs with varying input parameters. This procedure
simultaneously enables the handling of epistemic uncertainty, as each analysis run results
in data that can be used to get better knowledge about the software architecture, as well
as handling the described level 1 uncertainty.
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This chapter introduces an example scenario, which we use to demonstrate our contribution
regarding an extended software architecture model and mapping to a logic program.
The example is based on the inaccuracy of using GPS for location detection, depending
on various environmental factors. For this example, we additionally focus on the reduced
signal quality and increased acquisition time of indoor operation [20].
The scenario is comprised of three actors:
• Visitor, an actor that does not belong to the company but has a meeting in the
meeting room.
• Worker, an actor working for the company, currently in the meeting room waiting
for the Visitor.
• Scientist, an actor that works in the laboratory and has exclusive access to the room.
The location of each actor is monitored using a GPS location service. The location services
of the Worker and Scientist use a high-sensitivity GPS sensor, while the service of the
Visitor uses a standard GPS sensor. The blue circles, shown in Figure 5.1, represent the







Figure 5.1: Initial setup of the running example.
In the scenario, a database exists, which is comprised of sensitive research data from the
Scientist. Read and write access to the database is only permitted if the accessing user is
located inside the laboratory. We dene a data ow diagram of the scenario, shown in
Figure 5.2. The data ow from the Scientist to the Write DB Process and from the Write
DB Process to the Laboratory DB shows the sensitive research data, which is stored in the
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database. Regularly, only data ows are allowed to the Scientist, as he has exclusive access
to the laboratory. Both data ows from the Read DB Process to the Worker and Visitor,
which are normally prohibited, are highlighted in red. These prohibited data ows could



















Figure 5.2: Data ow diagram of the initial setup of the running example.
The Visitor now enters the meeting room to meet with the Worker. This reduces the
position accuracy and signal quality and increases the acquisition time of the standard
GPS sensor used by the Visitor’s location service. As shown in Figure 5.3, this increases








Figure 5.3: Progressed setup, with uncertainty about Visitor location.
As the exact location is uncertain, the location service of the Visitor might report that
the Visitor is located in the laboratory. This results in the data ow diagram shown in























Figure 5.4: Data ow diagram, with unidentied illegal data ow to Visitor.
By adding our concept of trust, we combine the environmental factors of the location
service. Due to the reduced position accuracy and signal quality of the location service,
we can calculate that the trust in the correctness of the location information of the Visitor
is low. We also add a trust requirement to the read access location, which is required to
access the laboratory database. This results in the data ow diagram shown in Figure 5.5,



























In this chapter, we present the metamodel representation of the concept of trust we have
dened in Chapter 4. We rst give a very detailed description of our model representation
of fuzzy inference systems (FIS) as means to combine environmental factors of the access
control properties into a trust value in Section 6.1. In Section 6.2 we discuss the possibilities
of how to represent trust in a model and explain our reasoning behind the representation
we chose as part of our contribution. Finally, Section 6.3 describes how we extend the DFD
metamodel to cover everything described in the previous sections. We go into detail on
how trust is calculated, how we extend characteristics, and how existing reusable behavior
denitions are modied to consider our concept of trust.
6.1 Fuzzy Inference SystemModeling
We dene our concept of trust as a composition of environmental factors. Consequently,
we need to dene a way to combine values of environmental factors to form a single value
that represents trust.
We propose the use of FISs to provide a way of combining the environmental factors.
Our proposed FIS rst fuzzies the crisp input values of the environmental factors by
mapping values to existing linguistic values. An example is the way we mapped the crisp
value of 7.5 liters of rain per< to the values of the linguistic concept of ’heaviness of rain’
in Section 2.3, using the membership functions shown in Figure 2.4. Rules utilize these
linguistic values to combine inputs and form a trust output distribution. The resulting
distribution is then defuzzied, using one of a set of predened defuzzication functions,
to create a crisp trust output value. This trust value represents the trust in the correctness
of the access control properties supplied from the service. We see multiple benets from
using FIS:
Linguistic concepts are used to abstract from the actual mathematical input and to enable
the implementation of rules in a natural language way. This increases the understandability
of dened inputs, rules, and trust output, making it easier to create new and interpret
existing FISs calculation rules. When compared to a calculation rule in the form of a
formula, the FIS’s increased interpretability allows the calculation rule to be extended and
modied more easily.
Another benet of using linguistic concepts as input is that a software architect, creating
the calculation rules, does not necessarily have to deal with the actual values of the
environmental factors. The knowledge of which specic value may be ’high’ or ’low’, for
example, can be taken over by someone else involved in the development process. The
software architect only has to work with linguistic concepts he might already be familiar
with. The concrete input membership functions of the linguistic values might be dened
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by another role (security expert, system administrator), which is familiar with, e.g., the
technical specications of the used sensors or how physical conditions inuence them.
When using our proposed FIS, we can ensure that the same kinds of properties, e.g.,
location information from dierent services, work with the same defuzzier and set of
trust membership functions. This makes the resulting trust values of dierent information
services comparable to each other while having dierent inputs and rules.
We create a metamodel representation of our proposed FIS. Creating this metamodel
representation enables a software architect or security expert to dene a FIS without the
need to utilize tools they might not already be familiar with, like the Fuzzy Logic Toolbox
of MATLAB [44].
MembershipFunction







+ METHOD : DEFUZZY_Method
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Figure 6.1: Class diagram excerpt of the FIS metamodel representation.
Figure 6.1 shows a class diagram representation of our metamodel representation. A
FuzzyInferenceSystem class contains the fuzzier, defuzzier, and rules and also represents
the knowledge base of the FIS, see 2.3.
The database of the FIS is split into FuzzicationFunction, utilized by the fuzzier, and
DefuzzicationFunction, utilized by the defuzzier. The set of instances of Fuzzication-
Function represent the inputs in the FIS, DefuzzicationFunction represents the outputs.
As we only aim to calculate a single trust output, the amount of DefuzzicationFunction of
each FuzzyInferenceSystem is limited to one. Both FuzzicationFunction and Defuzzica-
tionFunction are derived from FuzzyFunction. FuzzyFunction is an abstract representation of
a linguistic concept used by the FIS as input or output. The FuzzyFunction denes a range
and contains a set of MembershipFunction. As the naming suggests, MembershipFunction
represent fuzzy sets of the linguistic values.
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MembershipFunction
+ calculateTrustWeight(x double): double
GeneralizedBellMF
+ a : double
+ b : double
+ c : double
ZMF
+ a : double
+ b : double
SMF
+ a : double
+ b : double
TriangularMF
+ a  : double
+ b  : double
+ m : double
GaussianMF
+ o  : double
+ m : double
TrapezoidalMF
+ a : double
+ b : double
+ c : double
+ d : double
Figure 6.2: Class diagram excerpt of the membership functions of the FIS metamodel.
Following the Fuzzy Logic Toolbox [44], we implement six predened kinds of membership
functions, shown in Figure 6.3. Each membership function oers a dierent set of parame-
ters that inuence the general shape of the function. Exemplary instances to showcase the
overall shape of the membership functions are shown in Figure 6.3. As shown in Figure
6.3, each MembershipFunction implements calculateTrustWeight(x), which calculates the
trust weight of x, with regards to the instance and parameters of the membership function.














































































Figure 6.3: Examples of membership functions.
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Figure 6.4, shows the environmental factor inputs and trust output we have dened for
our running example. Figures 6.4a, 6.4b, 6.4c show the inputs for the three environmental
factors of a GPS location service. As described in Chapter 5, we derive the shape and
values of the membership functions and corresponding fuzzy sets from the sample data we
could extract from existing literature [20]. For the trust output shown in Figure 6.4d, we
simply dened three equal gaussian membership functions which are an equal distance
apart.
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Figure 6.4: Membership functions of inputs and output of the running example.
The rule base of the FIS is made up of a set of Rule. Each Rule references a set if Mem-
bershipFunction as inputs which are connected logically, with a RULE_Operator. The
RULE_Operators are either the logical AND or OR operator.
The FuzzyInferenceSystem contains multiple enumeration values to instantiate the actual
operators used for the mapping of the input to output values. All of the possible operators
and calculation rules we represent in our model are based on the settings which are possible
in Fuzzy Logic Toolbox in MATLAB [44] and the ISO IEC 61131 standard regarding fuzzy
control programming [34].
The DEFUZZY_Method species the calculation rule used in the defuzzication process.
We support the center of gravity (COG), center of area (COA), left most max (LM), and
right most max (RM). The corresponding formulas are presented in Table 2.3.
The ACCU_Operator denes the methods used for accumulating the results of each rule
to the fuzzy output. We support the max operator of Mamdani (MAX), the bounded sum
(BSUM), and the normalized sum (NSUM). The corresponding formulas are presented in
Table 2.2.
The AND_Operator and OR_Operator specify the operators that can be used as the im-
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plementation of the logical connection in Rule. For the logical AND, we support the min
operator of Mamdani (MIN), the product (PROD), and the bounded dierence (BDIF).
For the logical OR, we support the max operator of Mamdani (MAX), the algebraic sum
(ASUM), and the bounded sum (BSUM). The corresponding formulas are presented in
Table 2.1.
6.2 Representation of Trust
Using the FISs described in Section 6.1 to calculate the trust still leaves the question on
how to represent trust in a metamodel and analysis explicitly. As we focus on Industry 4.0
software systems, the applicability to Industry 4.0 specic scenarios must be considered
when choosing a representation. For an analysis approach, trust in a property of, e.g., an
actor, needs to be compared to the trust in properties that make up data classications, so
the comparability of the chosen representation is crucial.
We identify three possible solutions for trust to be represented:
Crisp output value The crisp output value of the FIS can be represented using a double
value. This makes it possible to compare the value to possible access control requirements
very accurately. During an analysis run, e.g., using data ows, see Section 2.2, changes to
the trust of a property can be made. A valid use case might be data owing through a lter,
which reduces sensor noise by a given factor, thus increasing the trust value of specic
properties. These changes can be made very nely granular, depending on the context.
Especially in edge cases, these ne granular changes could result in better analysis results
or reveal unexpected outcomes. At the time of writing this thesis, however, we struggle
to identify use cases, either from real-world industry applications or scientic research,
which would benet from these kinds of ne granular changes. Additionally, it is tough to
reason why a certain part of the system might increase or decrease trust by a xed factor.
In the sensor noise use case, trust values might not just be dependent on sensor noise but
rather be a combination of varying environmental factors. As there might be dierent
services supplying similar properties, which experience dierent environmental factors,
see Section 4.2.3, reducing sensor noise might not increase the trust value equally for each
service.
For trust values to be comparable, they need to be based on the same mathematical interval
or range of values. As described before, dierent services might supply similar properties,
but the calculation of their trust value is done using dierent FIS. To make the resulting
values comparable, each trust value must be calculated with the same possible range.
When considering the crisp trust value as a percent value, this interval would be [0, 100].
Additionally, it would need to be assured that the output of each FIS can reach the outer
limits of the interval. This is not always possible depending on the fuzzy inputs, rules,
and output of a FIS. A solution would be to normalize each trust value to be in the same
interval. To do so, the theoretical minimum and maximum crisp output value of each FIS
would need to be known. Calculating the minimum and maximum can only be done by
calculating the crisp output of the FIS for each possible combination of input values. The
amount of combinations scales exponentially with the number of inputs in the FIS, making
this solution very computationally intensive.
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Fuzzy output function Using the fuzzy output function, as shown in Figure 2.5, to rep-
resent the trust has similar advantages to using the crisp output value. It enables even
more ne granular changes to the trust, as much information is still present compared to
the defuzzied crisp value. However, one of the most signicant downsides is that these
potentially complex functions are hard to represent in a model. Additionally, like when
using the crisp output value, it is hard to nd valid reasoning for doing any of the ne
granular changes, as we do not have information about any use cases or scenarios from
the real world. The problem regarding comparability is emphasized due to the variability
in comparing functions.
Labels Using labels to represent trust is inspired by the way properties are represented
in the data ow analysis approach described in Section 2.2. Labels can be represented as
literals of an enumeration. We propose a mapping of the crisp output value to one of a
xed set of labels. Each label represents one fuzzy set of the fuzzy output of a FIS. A trust
output of a FIS, which is made up of three fuzzy sets, ’low’, ’mid’, and ’high’, results in
three possible trust values that can be utilized for access control analysis. Simply dening
the possible trust labels beforehand and forcing each output of a FIS to be made up of
fuzzy sets according to these labels makes the resulting mapped trust labels comparable.
Depending on the situation or system setup, a change in trust is achieved by choosing a
trust label that is semantically higher or lower than the current label. This makes changes
in the trust values less abstract and easier to understand than the two previous solutions.
More ne granular changes to the trust are not possible. By increasing the number of
trust labels and consequently the number of fuzzy sets of the fuzzy output of a FIS, we can
generally increase the granularity, with the downside of simultaneously increasing the
complexity and modeling eort of the FIS. However, this solution still grants the software
architect the ability to analyze the system and change environment parameters of services
iteratively, and monitor if these changes in the system’s deployment can result in potential
violations against access control rules. Additionally, as discussed in the two previous
solutions, we currently do not have any use cases that would benet from ne granular
changes in trust or where these changes could not be represented equally using labels.
As we have discussed, we currently do not see any real-world benet of representing
trust as the fuzzy or crisp outputs. Since it integrates well with the existing DFD ap-
proach, we described in Section 2.2, and as we currently see no benet in using the other
representations, we choose to represent trust as labels.
6.3 Extended DFDMetamodel
As we have discussed in Section 6.2, we choose to use labels to represent trust in access
control properties. Using labels to represent the trust enables us to reuse concepts and
model elements that already exist in the DFD approach we described in Section 2.2. The
concept of labels is used in the DFD model and analysis to represent the clearance of
nodes and the classication data. We add additional labels representing trust that can be
calculated using a FIS and explicitly assigned to property labels. An excerpt of the class
diagram representation of the extended metamodel is shown in Figure 6.5. We highlight
the model elements added by our approach by using bold lines.
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can be derived to
InformationService
+ inputs : double [1..*]
+ fis : FuzzyInferenceSystem
Figure 6.5: Class diagram showing the extended metamodel representation of the DFD.
6.3.1 Information Services
InformationService is an explicit representation of a service that supplies information used
for access control, as we have described in Section 4.3. An information service contains a
set of inputs and a FIS.
The set of inputs represents the values of environmental factors that inuence the trust
in the validity or correctness of the information. Environmental factors might be the
accuracy of the source that is used to measure the information, e.g., a sensor, the average
age of the supplied information, and various actual environment parameters that inuence
the trust.
The FIS species how the trust is calculated, that is associated with the properties supplied
by the InformationService.
6.3.2 Extending Characteristics
To add the trust labels to the model, we add the TrustedCharacteristicType, which derives
from CharacteristicType. In addition to CharacteristicType, the TrustedCharacteristicType
references an additional Enumeration, which is made up of the trust labels.
To explicitly correlate a InformationService with a property, we add TrustedCharacteristic,
which derives from Characteristic. TrustedCharacteristic references a InformationService
and a TrustedCharacteristicType, which is derived from the type reference of Characteristic.
The value reference, which represents an access control property is trusted with the trust
label that can be calculated from the service referenced with source.
Based on the way we added TrustedCharacteristic, we also add TrustedDataCharacteristi-
cReference, which derives from DataCharacteristicReference, which refers to an additional
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Label representing the trust in the label referenced as literal. The TrustedDataCharacteris-
ticReference enables the use of trust labels in assignments of behavior denitions.
Using our extended data ow diagram metamodel, we have implemented the running
example that we describe in Chapter 5. We present an object diagram representation of
an excerpt of this metamodel instance in Figure 6.9. The Scientist, Worker, and Visitor
are represented by instances of Actor. Each of the actors has an owned behavior and
a TrustedCharacteristic. The behavior is not specially shown in the model. The char-
acteristics are of the type ’Location’, which represents the location of the actor. In the
running example, the location information of the scientist and worker is supplied by a
service, which uses a high sensitivity GPS sensor. In contrast, the visitor’s location is
supplied by a service that uses a standard GPS sensor. These services are represented by
the instances of InformationService ’HighSensitivityGPS’ and ’StandardSensitivityGPS’.
We have already described the FIS instance of the information services in Section 6.1, and
show a representation of the membership functions in Figure 6.4. The characteristic of
the scientist has the value ’Laboratory’, and the characteristic of the worker has the value
’Meeting_Room’ because the high sensitivity service supplies the precise location. Due to
the poor quality of the standard sensitivity service when used indoors, the characteristic
of the visitor has the values, ’Outside’, ’Meeting_Room’ and ’Laboratory’.
The ’read_DB’ instance of Process connects two instances of DataFlow. One data ow from
the laboratory database to the process and a data ow from the process to the actors. The
laboratory database is represented by an instance of Store. Similar to the other actors, the
laboratory database has an instance of TrustedCharacteristic. In the running example, this
characteristic denes the access rights for read access. The database should only be read
by actors located in the laboratory, so the characteristic’s value is ’Laboratory’. The trust
of the characteristic is xed to ’trust_high’, as the access rights should not depend on
environmental factors of the system.
6.3.3 Behavior Definition
The data ow diagram approach we described in Section 2.2 represents behavior denitions
as a combination of input and output pins, as well as Assignments. These assignments
are made up of Terms which dene how properties are assigned from the input pin to the
output pin.
The original publication of the data ow diagram approach describes behavior templates
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Figures 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8 give a visual representation of the behavior templates. Each pair of
purple and orange rectangles represents a characteristic, which either is the input or the
output of the behavior. The purple rectangle represents the access control property label,
which the TrustedCharacteristic references with value. The orange rectangle represents the
trust label of the corresponding access control property, which the TrustedCharacteristic
references with trust. These characteristics dene the properties required to access the
data that ows to or from the node for access control.
We split these ve behavior templates in two categories, templates where the behavior
does not modify the input characteristics before passing it on as their output and templates
where the behavior modies the input in some way.
Figure 6.6 shows the two behavior templates, that do not modify the input. The Forwarder
directly copies the characteristic from input to output, without changing it. A Syncer acts
like the Forwarder behavior template, but waits for additional input, without considering











Figure 6.6: Extended behavior templates [66].
The behavior templates that modify the input characteristics are shown in Figure 6.7. The
Declassier copies the characteristics from the input and adds a predened characteristic
to the output. For access control, the characteristics represent access rights. By including
an additional access right, the Declassier loosens the overall constraints of the output.
The Characteristic Changer acts like the Forwarder but changes the value of the input
characteristic to a dened value. For example, for a node that moves data from a database
located in the USA to a database located in Asia, the Characteristic Changer template might
be used to change the location value of the input characteristic from ’USA’ to ’Asia’.
The Joiner determines the output characteristics by merging the received value labels of
each input characteristic. The merging can be specied depending on the use case. For
example, the Joiner might propagate the highest classifying label, create a union of all
incoming data characteristics, or apply an intersection. As can be seen in Figures 6.6 and
6.7, the described behavior templates do not address the added trust directly and only
forward the trust labels. We propose two additional behavior templates, shown in Figure
6.8, which are explicitly centered around changes in trust.
The rst proposed behavior template is the Trust Decreaser. Similar to the Declassify
behavior shown in Figure 6.7, the Trust Decreaser copies the input value and trust com-
bination and adds an additional value trust combination to the output. The added value
trust combination has the same value as the input but sets the trust to a dened label.
The second proposed behavior template is the Trust Changer. The Trust Changer behavior
template is based on the Characteristic Changer behavior. Instead of explicitly changing

















Value X Trust z
Value Z
Figure 6.7: Behavior templates [66] that change or add labels.
trust label.
Trust labels can be viewed as hierarchical, where a higher label implies the existence of
the lower labels. It is up to the query that is to be executed to dene whether or not the
hierarchies are considered. If the query takes the hierarchy of trust labels into account,
using a Trust Changer to change the input trust label to a lower one, or a Trust Decreaser
to add an additional characteristic with a lower trust label, have an equal eect, as the
lower trust labels already implied the higher trust labels. However, if these hierarchies
are not taken into account by the query, reducing the required trust label with the Trust
Decreaser leaves access with a higher trust label still allowed, while changing the trust











Figure 6.8: Proposed behavior templates that explicitly change trust of an label.
All the behavior templates we describe in this section can be combined to represent the
behavior of a system with our extended data ow diagram metamodel. As described in
the original publication [66], instances of nodes that have one of these templates as their
behavior can be connected to represent system behavior. For example, a node might
declassify the characteristic value, followed by another node which increases the trust.
Changes in characteristic value and trust might occur simultaneously, and representing
this behavior in two separate nodes might be semantically incorrect. To combat this
situation, all behavior templates we describe in this section can be combined to form a
single behavior. For example, the Declassifyer and Trust Increaser are combined into one
behavior, which can be set as the behavior of a single node.
As shown in Figure 6.9, we use the Forwarder template as the behavior of the ’read_DB’
instance of Process and the ’Laboratory_DB’ instance of Store. Additionally, all behaviors
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This chapter focuses on our extended analysis process that is used with the data ow
diagrams that we describe in Chapter 6. The analysis process consists of the transformation
of the data ow diagram to a Prolog code base, which we describe in Section 7.2. This
transformation includes the calculation of a trust value based on the added information
services, which is described in Section 7.1. The resulting Prolog code base is then used
to solve a Prolog query that describes illegal data ows. A query usually consists of a
conjunction of clauses. We describe the query for our running example (see Chapter 5) in
Section 7.3.
7.1 Calculation of Trust
The calculation of the actual trust values is done during the transformation of the data
ow model to Prolog. We transform each InformationService to a single label. First, we
transform the contained FIS to a s le. This le format is dened by the Fuzzy Logic
Toolbox of MATLAB [44] to have a textual representation of a FIS. Using fuzzy logic
control libraries [56] with the created .s le, we run the FIS, pass the input values of the
InformationService as inputs and receive the defuzzied crisp output as a result.
To map the crisp output value to xed labels, as described in Section 6.2, we rst calculate
the truth values for each membership function, of which the output of the transformed FIS
is made up of. Due to the restriction that forces each FIS output to be made up of fuzzy sets
according to the set of trust labels, we can map the resulting truth-values to each of the
corresponding trust labels. As we want to transform each InformationService to a single
trust label, we choose the label with the highest truth value. If two labels have an equal
truth value, the one that represents the weaker linguistic value is chosen, i.e., if ’high’ and
’mid’ trust have the same truth value, ’mid’ is chosen as label. Choosing the truest truth
label seemed the most logical approach, especially considering that use cases, which could
be used to deduce other more demanding selection processes, are currently not available.
We have already described this problem in Section 6.2, where we decided to use labels
because there are no use cases that would demand more ne granular representation.
7.2 Extended Prolog Mapping
To take advantage of the newly added trust value in the DFD analysis (see Section 2.2.3),
we have to extend the transformation of the DFD model instance to Prolog. This transfor-
mation has already been described in Section 2.2.2, so we will only cover the parts of the
transformation that we had to modify to add the trust value.
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Listing 7.1: Prolog facts representing the DFD structure, extended with trust label.
1 characteristicType(CT),
2 characteristicTypeValue(CT, V, I),
3 characteristicTypeTrust(CT, T, I),
4 nodeCharacteristic(N, CT, V, T).
Similar to the model representation in Section 6.3, our changes to the transformation of
DFD to Prolog are mainly focused on characteristics and characteristic types. We underline
our newly added fact and changes to the existing facts, in Listing 7.1 and Listing 7.4. The
transformation of characteristic types shown in line 1 and 2 of Listing 7.1 stays unchanged.
For each label of the enumeration to which a trusted characteristic type refers to as trust,
we add the creation of a fact, shown in line 3 of Listing 7.1. Similar to line 2 of Listing 7.1
we replace CT with the identier of the trusted characteristic type and T with the identier
of the trust label. I is replaced with the position of the trust label in the enumeration.
When transforming to the nodeCharacteristic fact in line 4 of Listing 7.1, we do
not want to create a fact for each label assigned to a node, like it is described in Section
2.2, as this would mix value labels and trust labels. We rather view the trust labels as
additional information to value labels, as a trust label does reect trust in the correctness
of a value (see Section 6.2). Consequently we create a fact as shown in line 4 of Listing
7.1 for each characteristic, that is assigned to a node. We rst calculate the trust value
of the referenced InformationService and map the value to a trust label, see Section 7.1.
Similar to the original transformation (see Section 2.2.2), we replace N with the identier
of the corresponding node, CT with the identier of the characteristic type and V with the
identier of the value label. We replace T with the identier of the trust label, that has
been calculated and corresponds to the value label, assigned to the node.
Listing 7.2: TrustedCharacteristicType Location of the running example transformed to
Prolog.
1 characteristicType(’Location’).
2 characteristicTypeValue(’Location’, ’Outside’, 0).
3 characteristicTypeValue(’Location’, ’MeetingRoom’, 1).
4 characteristicTypeValue(’Location’, ’Laboratory’, 2).
5 characteristicTypeTrust(’Location’, ’trust_low’, 0).
6 characteristicTypeTrust(’Location’, ’trust_mid’, 1).
7 characteristicTypeTrust(’Location’, ’trust_high’, 2).
Listing 7.2 shows the transformation of the trusted characteristic type Location from our
running example, see Chapter 5. The three value labels are each transformed to the Prolog
facts in lines 2 to 4. The corresponding trust labels are transformed to the Prolog facts
in lines 5 to 7. In their rst argument, the facts representing the value labels and the
facts representing the trust labels explicitly point to ’Location’, which is dened as a
characteristic type in line 1.
Listing 7.3 shows the transformation of the characteristics which are assigned to the Visitor
of our running example once he enters the meeting room. Like described in Section 2.2.2,
the Visitor node is dened as an actor in line 1. Lines 2 to 4 each describe a characteristic
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of the Visitor. For each of these characteristics, the trust label is calculated, as described in
Section 7.1, and set as the last argument of each of the Prolog facts.
Listing 7.3: Visitor node characteristic value labels and calculated trust label.
1 actor(’Visitor’).
2 nodeCharacteristic(’Visitor’, ’Location’, ’Laboratory’, ’
trust_low’).
3 nodeCharacteristic(’Visitor’, ’Location’, ’MeetingRoom’, ’
trust_low’).
4 nodeCharacteristic(’Visitor’, ’Location’, ’Outside’, ’trust_low
’).
Listing 7.4: Prolog rule representing node behavior, extended with trust label.
1 characteristic(N, PIN, CT, V, T, S, VF) :- ...
The behavior specication rule shown in line 1 of Listing 7.4, also needs to consider trust.
Consequently, with the added trust, the rule body is now created in a way, that it evaluates
to true, if the value label V and trust label T of characteristic type CT is available on the
pin PIN of node N.




4 characteristic(’read_DB’, ’out’, ’Location’, ’Laboratory’,
’trust_high’, S, VISITED) :-
5 inputFlow(’read_DB’, ’in’, _, F0, VISITED),
6 S0 = [F0 | _],
7 S = [S0],
8 characteristic(’read_DB’, ’in’, ’Location’, ’Laboratory’,
’trust_high’, S0, VISITED).
For the read_DB process in our running example, Listing 7.5 shows an excerpt of the
transformed behavior description. Line 1 denes that read_DB is a process node. Line 2
and 3 dene an input and output pin, which are assigned to the read_DB process.
The characteristic rule in line 4 of Listing 7.5, is dened for the output pin from
line 3. Lines 5 to 8 dene the rule body. The ’read_DB’ process has the forward behavior
described in Section 6.3.3. The rule states that the value label ’Laboratory’ with trust label
’trust_high’ of type ’Location’ is available at the output pin ’out’ if there is an input ow
to the process that has the same labels.
7.3 Prolog Query
As described in Section 2.2.3, the analysis is realized with queries to the generated Prolog
program. The clauses that can be used to dene the queries are based on the facts and
rules that make up the Prolog program. To account for the trust labels we added, we add a
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new clause and extend two clauses that were described in Section 2.2.3. We underline our
newly added clause and changes to the existing clauses, shown in Listing 7.6.
Listing 7.6: Modied clauses of the Prolog API to specify condentiality analyses.
1 characteristicTypeTrust(CT, T, I),
2 nodeCharacteristic(N, CT, V, T),
3 characteristic(N, PIN, CT, V, T, S).
The clause in line 1 of Listing 7.6 is similar to characteristicTypeValue(CT, V,
I) in Listing 2.3. It can be used to nd the trust label identier T of characteristic type
CT. Line 2 shows a clause to nd a tuple of label identier V and corresponding trust label
identier T of characteristic type CT that is active on the node with identier N. Line 3
shows the clause to nd a tuple of label identier V and corresponding trust label identier
T of characteristic type CT that is available on the pin with identier PIN of the node wit
identier N.




4 flowTree(A, PIN, S),
5 traversedNode(S, ST),
6 nodeCharacteristic(A, ’Location’, LOC, TRUST),
7 \+ nodeCharacteristic(ST, ’Read_Access’, LOC, TRUST).
For our running example, the clauses are combined to form the query shown in Listing
7.7. In our running example, each actor has one or multiple active ’Location’ values and
trust label pairs that indicate the actor’s location. The Laboratory DB store has an active
’Read_Acess’ value and trust label pair that denes the location that is required in order to
access the data base. For the analysis, we want to match the ’Location’ value and trust
label pairs of the actors with the ’Read_Access’ value and trust label pair of the store. If
no label pair can be matched, the corresponding data ow is illegal.
In lines 1 and 2, we rst dene that the identier A belongs to an actor and identier ST
belongs to a store. Line 3 denes that the pin with identier PIN is an input pin of the
actor with identier A. As we only compare labels of nodes, we do not have a ow tree
from a characteristic clause to verify that there even exists a data ow between
actor and store. Line 4 contains the helper clause to build a ow tree S of data ows that
arrive at the input pin with the identier PIN of the actor with identier A. Line 5 checks
if the store with identier ST is traversed in the ow tree S. Line 6 denes, LOC and
TRUST as placeholders for all tuples of label and trust label identiers of the ’Location’
characteristic type that are active on actor A. Line 7 denes that the tuple of placeholders
LOC and TRUST are also identiers of labels of the ’Read_Access’ characteristic type and
active on store ST. However, the line starts with \+ which is the ’not provable’ operator of
Prolog. This means that line 7 is only true if the labels with identiers LOC and Trust are
either not from characteristic type ’Read_Access’ or are not active on store ST, eectively






3 ST: Laboratory DB
4 LOC: MeetingRoom
5 TRUST: trust_high




10 ST: Laboratory DB
11 LOC: Laboratory
12 TRUST: trust_low




17 ST: Laboratory DB
18 LOC: MeetingRoom
19 TRUST: trust_low




24 ST: Laboratory DB
25 LOC: Outside
26 TRUST: trust_low
27 S: invalid read(dbEntry), LaboratoryDB->readDB(dbEntry),
write(dbEntry)->LaboratoryDB, Scientist->write(dbEntry)
Executing the described query shown in Listing 7.7 on the situation of our running example
shown in Figure 5.5 yields the solutions shown in Listing 7.8. Each solution states the
actual values of attributes that Prolog was able to resolve. For the query in Listing 7.7 this
is the actor A that reads data from the database but is not supposed to, the store ST which
denes his read access rules and from which the data is read, the location LOC and trust
TRUST of the actor, that do not match with the read access rules dened by the store. S
shows the ow tree, which can be used to trace the data ow to its origin.
Solution 0 in lines 1 to 6 show the solution that correctly identies the illegal data ow to
the Worker as the location is mismatched. Solutions 1 to 3 correctly identify the illegal
data ow to the Visitor. Lines 8 to 13 show one violation as the trust is low, even though
the location theoretically matches. Lines 15 to 20 and 22 to 27 show other violations that





In this chapter, we present the evaluation of our contribution. To gain a well-designed
evaluation structure, we use the Goal Question Metric (GQM) approach of [6]. We further
partition this chapter in the following sections:
Section 8.1 covers the evaluation design, including the GQM plan. In the evaluation design,
we dene our evaluation goals of Applicability, Accuracy, and Scalability. We further
describe each goal and dene the corresponding questions and metrics. In Section 8.2, we
give a detailed description of the exact setups that we used to evaluate each question. In
Section 8.3 we present and briey discuss the ndings of the evaluation of each question.
To conclude this chapter, we discuss the threads of validity of our evaluation and the
assumptions and limitations of our contribution in Section 8.4 and Section 8.5.
8.1 Evaluation Design
To gain a well-designed evaluation structure, we use the Goal Question Metric (GQM)
approach of [6]. We dene three evaluation goals:
• EG-1: Examine the applicability of the approach regarding the iterative creation
process of software architecture.
• EG-2: Examine the accuracy of the approach, with dened classes of errors, by
comparing the output of analysis runs to expected results.
• EG-3: Examine the scalability of the approach when analyzing large systems.
8.1.1 Evaluation Design for Applicability
To evaluate the applicability of the proposed concept of trust, we focus on the iterative
creation and evolution process of software architecture. This raises questions regarding
the applicability during design time and when the system is actively in use. Another part
of the contribution is the calculation of trust by the means of a FIS. This raises a question
about the applicability of FISs within the software development process. Another part
of applicability is the ability of the extended data ow diagram to dene condentiality
analyses, which raises a question about the expressive power of our approach.
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We formulate the following questions:
• Q1.1 Is the information to apply the proposed concept of trust to the described
metamodel and analysis process available during design time?
• Q1.2 Does adding the proposed concept of trust to the described metamodel and
analysis process produce additional value if a system is already deployed?
• Q1.3 Is the proposed FIS suitable to describe calculation rules for trust values?
• Q1.4 Is the expressiveness of the original data ow diagram approach and analysis
aected by the addition of the proposed concept of trust?
Since the questions described are not suited to be answered through metrics or measure-
ments, we strive to answer the questions argumentatively. All questions will be discussed
and, if appropriate, answered using examples.
8.1.2 Evaluation Design for Accuracy
To evaluate the accuracy, we base our evaluation design regarding evaluation goal EG-2
on the way the data ow diagram approach that our contribution is based on (see Section
2.2) was evaluated. The left side of Figure 8.1 shows the original design. They dene a pair
of scenarios for a given data ow diagram instance. One scenario without an issue and an
additional scenario where an issue has been introduced that leads to violations concerning
the analysis. The issues are either derived from related work or by themselves.
By adding our concept of trust, we identify dierent kinds of issues concerning the analysis.
An issue can be due to mismatched characteristic labels or be due to mismatched trust
labels. Based on this distinction, we dene four dierent scenarios, which need to be
considered to evaluate the accuracy of our contribution. Figure 8.1 shows the pair of
scenarios of the original approach, compared to the four scenarios we dene for our
contribution.























S1: An issue that is due to mismatched property labels is introduced by adding an illegal
data ow to the data ow diagram.
S2: An issue that is due to mismatched trust labels is introduced by identifying a scenario
based on the data ow diagram that reduces the trust label of a property.
S3: An issue is introduced, that is due to mismatched property and trust labels, by
combining S1 and S2.
From these scenarios, we derive the following evaluation questions to evaluate EG-2:
• Q2.1 What is the accuracy of the extended analysis in identifying issues in data ows
regarding issues that result from mismatched properties?
• Q2.2 What is the accuracy of the extended analysis in identifying issues in data ows
regarding issues that result from low trust?
• Q2.3 What is the accuracy of the extended analysis in identifying issues in data ows
regarding issues that result from a combination of mismatched properties and low
trust?
To answer the questions we create pairs of scenarios. Each pair consists of a S0 scenario
without an issue and either a S1, S2 or S3 scenario, depending on the evaluation question.
The metrics used to evaluate the questions concerned with goals EG-2 are:
M-2.1 Precision (p) calculates the ratio of correctly identied issues C? to the sum of C? + 5? .
5? , or the false positive value, are the number of issues that where identied as such, but
actually are not an issue that was introduced in the S1, S2 or S3 scenarios. ? = C?
C?+5? [55].
M-2.2 Recall (r) calculates the ratio of correctly identied issues C? to the overall positive
value % . For our use, the overall positive value % is the number of actually introduced
issues in the S1, S2 or S3 scenarios. % is the sum C? + 5= . 5= , or the false negative value, are






8.1.3 Evaluation Design for Scalability
Since our approach can be used to represent large systems, with many dierent Infor-
mationServices, trust values and general types of properties, our third evaluation goal
(EG-3) is concerned with the scalability of our approach. The execution time of a query
on the Prolog code mainly depends on the structure of the data ow diagram instance,
the executed query, the used Prolog library, and optimization techniques, which is out
of the scope of this thesis. For the scalability evaluation, we focus on the time needed to
calculate trust and the time needed to map an extended data ow diagram to Prolog code,
as our approach primarily inuences the mapping. The execution time of the mapping
mainly depends on the size of the resulting Prolog code. Some model aspects, like the
number of characteristics and pins of each node or the amount of data ows in the system,
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can have a strong impact on the size of the created Prolog code. Each assignment of
the behavior of a node, for example, adds a characteristic(N, PIN, CT, V, T,
S, VF) :- ... rule for each value of each characteristic type to the Prolog clauses of
the corresponding node (see Section 7.2). However, we want to focus on the scalability of
the model aspects we added or modied as part of our approach.
This raises the following questions:
• Q3.1 How does the time required for calculating the trust label scale when increasing
the number of environmental factors that impact trust?
• Q3.2 How does the time to map the model to Prolog scale when increasing the
number of information services and properties?
• Q3.3 How does the time to map the model to Prolog scale when increasing the
number of trust labels?
• Q3.4 How does the time to map the model to Prolog scale when increasing the
number of types of properties?
We use the time needed for each run of the FIS or mapping as metric M-3 to evaluate the
questions concerned with EG-3. The times needed to answer each question are measured,
and corresponding aspects of the models are incremented individually. The times of each
increment of runs are plotted to better view the general tendency of the time behavior.
8.2 Evaluation Setup
In this section, we dene the setups that we use to answer the questions presented in the
previous section. These setups describe the DFD instances and analysis queries used to
evaluate the applicability, accuracy, and scalability of our approach.
8.2.1 Setups for Evaluating Applicability
The rst two questions regarding applicability, Q1.1 and Q1.2, both focus on the appli-
cability of our approach in dierent phases of the software development process. We
generally view the software development process to be of iterative nature. During design
time, the software architect iteratively constructs and changes the software architecture.
After each iterative change, the model can be validated against a set of requirements using
an analysis process like the one we present in our contribution. This iterative process
continues after the system is deployed. Detailed models that reect the deployed system
are used with analysis processes to investigate the impact of what-if scenarios before
implementing them. This reduces the risk of introducing errors into the existing system,
which is particularly important in the context of access control.
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8.2.2 Setups for Evaluating Accuracy
Due to the lack of existing publications that focus on the trust in access control properties,
see Section 6.2, we can not use any existing scenarios from other publications for the trust
issue scenarios (S2) described in the evaluation design. For property issue scenarios (S1),
we can reuse the scenarios that were used by the original data ow diagram approach [66],
that our contribution is based on.
To still be able to answer Q2.2 and Q2.3, we extend existing use-cases with real-world
environmental factors that are comprehensible and consistent with the use case description.
We extract exact values for these environmental factors that produce a potential issue from
existing research. As the research regarding real-world environmental factors, without
any background knowledge, was very time consuming and had to be done for each use
case individually in order to be consistent with the use case description, we base the
accuracy evaluation regarding questions Q2.2 and Q2.3 on only one use case. To answer
questions Q2.2 and Q2.3, we use the ABAC use case, which has also be used to evaluate
the original data ow diagram approach [66]. We chose the ABAC use case, as the ABAC
model has high expressive power. Additionally, the trust chains, we have already described
in Section 4.2.2, are originally dened for the ABAC access control model and can be
closely represented with the environmental factors of our concept of trust.
The existing ABAC use case describes a banking system, which is deployed in the USA and
Asia. Actors in the system can be Clerks or Managers. Clerks can register customers, look
them up and determine a credit line. Managers can additionally also register celebrities, or
move customers between regions. A data ow diagram representation of the use case is





























































Figure 8.2: Representation of the ABAC use case data ow diagram [66].
51
8 Evaluation
Four properties are used for access control.
• The Role of an actor in the data ow model, e.g. Clerk, Manager.
• The Location describes the location of an actor, e.g. USA, Asia.
• The Status of a customer, which data is processed, e.g. Regular, Celebrity.
• The Origin of the customer data, e.g. USA, Asia.
Setup for Q2.1
To answer the question concerned with the accuracy in identifying issues in data ows
that result from mismatched properties, we dene a pair of scenarios that consist of a
S0 and a S1 scenario. We reuse the pair of scenarios that were used for the original
data ow diagram approach [66]. As these scenarios do not contain our concept of trust,
trust values need to be dened for each characteristic. For this question, trust should not
introduce an issue to the S0 scenario and have no eect on the mismatched properties
of the S1 scenario. We add a default trust value to every characteristic. The default trust
label represents complete trust in the validity of the property. This way, the resulting
scenarios semantically match the original scenarios, as the properties are always valid and


























































Figure 8.3: Reduced representation of the ABAC data ow diagram, with an introduced
issue regarding mismatched properties.
This way, we can also ensure, that functionality of the original approach is preserved and
our extension has not aected the capability of the analysis in nding issues in data ows
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that result from mismatched properties. An example data ow diagram representation
of the previously described ABAC use case, with default trust is shown in Figure 8.3. An
exemplary issue that is introduced in the S1 scenario is highlighted in red.
For the sake of clarity, we only briey describe the remaining use cases used to answer
Q2.1. Seifermann et al. have created a data set [67], containing detailed descriptions of the
use cases, as well as S0 and S1 scenarios. The data set also contains the data ow diagram
instances that we use as a base for this setup and add our previously described default
trust to.
• DAC: A le-sharing system used by a family to share and view pictures. The actors
mother and dad add and view pictures. The actor aunt only views pictures. An actor
called indexing bot might discover the stored pictures but is not allowed to access
them. To introduce the issue, a ow is added that represents a scenario where the
indexing bot views the pictures.
• MAC: A airspace monitoring system with three levels of classication. The is used to
monitor civil and military planes. The actor clerk uses the system to create and store
weather reports. An actor ight controller registers civil airplanes and determines
new routes based on the clerks weather reports and the position of other civil planes.
The actor military ight controller registers military airplanes and determines new
routes for military airplanes by taking into account the weather reports of the clerk
and the civil airplane positions of the ight controller. The issue is added by creating
a scenario, where the ight controller also takes into account the positions of military
planes when determining new routes.
• ContactSMS: A user managing his contacts and sending SMS. The actor User can
perform multiple actions on his list of contacts, including sending an SMS to a
selected contact. To send an SMS, the number of the contact is extracted and sent
to the actor SMS Gateway. To introduce the issue, the extraction of the number is
skipped, eectively sending all contact information to the SMS Gateway.
• DistanceTracker: A service that tracks locations and running statistics. The actor
User sends his location to a distance tracker service that stores the locations. The
locations are used by the distance tracker service to calculate the distance and, with
the User’s consent, sends the distance to a tracking service, which stores the distance.
The issue is introduced by skipping the declassication process, which requires the
User’s consent.
• TravelPlanner: A user booking a ight with a travel planner app. The app connects
to a travel agency, which connects to the airline, to show and book available ights.
To pay for a ight, the User’s credit card information is taken from a banking app.
To introduce an issue, the declassication of the User’s credit card information is





To answer the question concerned with the accuracy in identifying issues in data ows
that result from a lowered trust, we dene a pair of scenarios that consist of a S0 and a S2
scenario. To properly cover all aspects of the used ABAC use case, we split the S2 scenario
into two sub-scenarios. The rst scenario (S2.1) covers the trust in the Role properties
of the actors, the second scenario (S2.2) covers the trust in the Location property of the
actors. We further dene an analysis query that is applied for both scenarios.
Role The scenario that introduces a trust issue in the Role of an actor focuses on the
age of the role information. Similar to the denition of the ABAC access control model
[32] we do not directly address authentication mechanisms or other aspects of identity
management, as the eld is very wide, and we can not create a representative use case for
real-world scenarios without applicable case studies. We thus assume that the actors in
the ABAC use case are bound to identity providers. Identity providers are services that
verify that an actor has a certain role by using a user name and password. A role and IP
address pair is saved in a database, which the access control system uses to determine
if an actor has a certain role. After a set amount of time, the role and IP address pair is
removed from the database, which requires the actor to reverify his role with the identity
provider before executing an access that requires a certain role.
If the manager wants to register a new celebrity, the banking system requires that the last
verication of the manager role is less than 2 minutes old. However, to move a regular
customer from the USA to Asia, the last verication of the manager role is required to
be less than 5 minutes old. The original data ow diagram representation of the banking
system can only represent this requirement by adding multiple hierarchical roles, mixing
the semantics of roles with the semantics of time or age. With our concept of trust, we can
dene decreasing trust, depending on the age of the role information. For our extended
model, we dene a manager role provider service. The trust in the information supplied
by the service is only dependent on the age of the role information. The FIS input of role
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Figure 8.4: Fuzzy input of information age of the manager role provider service.
age is shown in Figure 8.4, the trust output is similar to the output dened for our running
example, shown in Figure 6.4d. We chose the input membership functions to represent
the prior description of the verication times for dierent actions of the manager. New
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age corresponds to high trust, which is necessary to register a celebrity. Intermediate age
corresponds to mid trust, which is necessary to move a regular customer from the USA to
Asia.
For our scenario, the manager wants to register a new celebrity. The manager veries
his role with the manager role provider service and can then enter the celebrity customer
details. However, the manager takes > 2 minutes to enter all of the celebrity customer
details, and the action is aborted, eectively locking out the manager of registering new

























































Figure 8.5: Reduced representation of the ABAC data ow diagram of the S2.1 scenario.
Location The scenario that introduces a trust issue in the Location of actors focuses on
the resolution of the country geolocation from the IP addresses of the actors in the system.
Actual accurate information about the geolocation of a related IP is only known by the
internet service provider (ISP). This data is not available for commercial applications, like
the banking system of the ABAC use case. The banking system has to rely on public or
commercial geolocation databases and geolocation services. These databases use specially
aggregated blocks of IP addresses to match the IP addresses to geolocations.
Even though vendors of such databases claim country-level geolocation accuracy of greater
than 97%, this claim can not be universally conrmed [69]. A vast majority of entries in
the databases refer only to a few popular countries, e.g., USA and Russia. This imbalance
in the representation of countries creates an accuracy bias towards specic countries.
Depending on the database, errors in the reported position range between 200Km and
800Km [54]. When looking at router, instead of end-host IP addresses, the country-level
geolocation accuracy can dier by nearly 50% between databases [25].
For our scenario, we make the locations of the ABAC case study more specic. Instead of
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the regions USA and Asia, we narrow the locations down to the specic countries USA
and Hong Kong.
As a cost-saving measure, the banking system switches the geolocation database, which
provides the location information, from the commercial NetAcuity [48] database to the
free MaxMind-GeoLite [45] database. For the US, this change only reduces the country
geolocation accuracy by a negligible amount. However, for countries like Hong Kong, this
change reduces the country geolocation accuracy by more than 40%.
This low accuracy could result in incorrect system behavior once deployed and opens up
the possibility for attacks utilizing the inaccurate country geolocation resolution. In our
example, this issue results in the clerk from Hong Kong sometimes not being able to access
the Hong Kong customer storage, as the access control system in place would block all
data ows.
The original data ow diagram representation of the banking system has no way of
representing this change. Consequently, analyzing the data ow diagram does not yield
any insight into the changed situation. With our concept of trust, this change in databases
can be represented in the model. A reduces representation of the extended data ow
diagram is shown in Figure 8.6. The low accuracy directly impacts the trust in the location.
This way, the analysis can identify that using the MaxMind-GeoLite database results in a



























































Query We analyze both scenarios with the Prolog query, shown in Listing 8.1.
The query evaluates whether at least one of three kinds of data ows exist in the model. In
line 1 of the query, we rst ensure that node A is an actor node. Line 2 ensures that the pin
PIN is considered an actual input pin of the actor A. The facts in lines 3 and 4 check the
characteristics of the actor A, while the facts in lines 5 and 6 check the characteristics of
the data that can ow to PIN of actor A. Lines 8, 9, and 10 dene a disjunction, where each
line contains a conjunction of facts that refer to the value or trust of the characteristics
that are checked in lines 3 to 6.
Line 8 denes that a data ow is considered illegal, if the Location LOC of the actor is
equal to the Origin ORIG of the customer nodeLiteral(CV, N),whose data is in the system,
but the trust in the actors Location LOC_TRUST is not equal to the trust in the customer
Origin ORIG_TRUST. With this statement issues like the one described in scenario S2.2
can be identied.
Lines 9 and 10 dene the use case that has been described for scenario S2.1. The facts in
line 9 dene that a data ow is illegal if the actor Location LOC of the actor and the Origin
ORIG of the customer data are dierent and the actor does not have the ’Manager’ role
or trust in the ’Manager’ role is ’low’. This means that only an actor with the ’Manager’
role that is at least trusted ’mid’ is allowed to move customers. Line 10 denes that a
data ow is illegal if actors handle customer data with the status ’Celebrity’ without the
’Manager’ role or trust in the ’Manager’ role is ’mid’. This means that only an actor with
the ’Manager’ role that is trusted ’high’ is allowed to register celebrity customers.
Listing 8.1: The query used for the analysis of the two S2 scenarios.
1 actor(A),
2 inputPin(A,PIN),
3 nodeCharacteristic(A, ’Location’, LOC, LOC_TRUST),
4 nodeCharacteristic(A, ’Role’, ROLE, ROLE_TRUST),
5 characteristic(A, PIN, ’Origin’, ORIG, ORIG_TRUST, S),
6 characteristic(A, PIN, ’Status’, STAT, STAT_TRUST, S),
7 (
8 LOC = ORIG, LOC_TRUST \= ORIG_TRUST;
9 LOC \= ORIG, (ROLE \= ’Manager’; ROLE_TRUST = ’low’);
10 STAT = ’Celebrity’, (ROLE \= ’Manager’; ROLE_TRUST = ’mid’)
11 ).
Setup for Q2.3
To answer the question regarding the accuracy in identifying issues that result from
mismatched properties and lowered trust, we dene a pair of scenarios that consists of a
S0 and a S3 scenario. To create the S3 scenario, we reuse the S1 scenario of the ABAC use
case, that we use for Q2.1 and combine it with the S2.1 scenario, that we dene for Q2.2.
The S0 scenario is shown in Figure 8.2. Figure 8.7 shows the S3 scenario. The ’Manager’
role’s reduced trust introduces trust issues in the data ows to the ’register celebrity’ and
’move customer’ nodes, while the added data ow to ’register customer’ introduces a
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property issue. For the analysis, we use the same query that has been used for the setup


























































Figure 8.7: Reduced representation of the ABAC data ow diagram of the S2.3 scenario.
8.2.3 Setups for Evaluating Scalability
Each setup is run with increasing numbers, starting at 1, doubling the value till 2048 is
reached. Each of these setups is executed ten times to reduce the side eects of the JVM
and get a good variance when averaging the values.
All scalability setups are run on the following conguration:
• Intel i5 5200U (2 cores, 4 threads) @ 2.20 - 2.70 GHz
• 8 GB RAM
• 500 GB SSD hard drive
• Ubuntu 20.04 LTS, 64-Bit
• Java 11 (OpenJDK 64-Bit, version 11.0.11)
Setup for Q3.1
The rst question regarding scalability focuses on the time required for calculating the
trust labels, depending on the number of environmental factors. We utilize the FIS of the
high sensitivity GPS location service we already created for the running example, see
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Chapter 5, as a base.
We increase the number of inputs by adding randomly created FuzzycationFunctions
to the existing FIS. To ensure that the randomly created FuzzycationFunctions are well-
formed, we limit the FuzzycationFunction only to be made up of between two and ve
triangular membership functions. We also limit the range of the FuzzycationFunctions to
start at 0 and end at a random number between 10 and 1000.
Rules are generated by combining a randomly chosen membership function of each
FuzzycationFunction. We limit these rules to only use the AND RULE_Operator. To cover
every possible membership function once, we generate ve rules. If every membership
function of a FuzzycationFunction with less than ve membership functions is already
used once, a random membership function of the FuzzycationFunction is chosen for
subsequent rules. The DefuzzycationFunction is the same as the one we use in the running
example, shown in Figure 6.4d. It is made up of three Gaussian membership functions, each
representing a trust label. A random membership function of the DefuzzycationFunction
is chosen for each rule.
We initialize the FIS with the MIN AND_Operator, MAX ACCU_Operator, and center of
gravity as defuzzication method.
Setup for Q3.2
The second question regarding scalability focuses on the time required to transform the
model to Prolog code, depending on the number of information services. This question
explores the trade-o in time associated with a more ne granular division and represen-
tation of dierent information services.
To be mapped to Prolog, an information service has to be linked to at least one TrustedChar-
acteristic. In the sense of the access control analysis, a TrustedCharacteristic represents a
property that may be used in access control. This means that additionally to the increased
number of information services in the model, we consequently increase the number of
properties.
Based on the running example, see Chapter 5, we add information services with ran-
domized input values. To minimize the inuence of the FIS on the time needed to map
to Prolog, each information service references the same FIS of the high sensitivity GPS
location service of the running example. This should reduce the impact of the FIS to a
constant.
For each added information service, we add a TrustedCharacteristic with the ’Location’
TrustedCharacteristicType. To add the TrustedCharacteristics to a node, we assign them
to each of the actors of the running example. The node behavior in our running example is
only made up of the forward behavior template so that the behavior can remain unchanged.
Setup for Q3.3
The third question regarding scalability focuses on the time required to map the model to
Prolog code, depending on the size of the trust enumeration of a TrustedCharacteristic-
Type. This question explores the trade-o in time associated with more ne granular trust
handling using many trust labels.
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To isolate the eect of the size of the trust enumeration, we only create a single Trust-
edCharacteristic and InformationService. The FIS of the InformationService is made up
of the tree FuzzycationFunction inputs of our running example from Chapter 5. To
match the increasing number of trust labels, we at the same time add a corresponding
membership function to the DefuzzicationFunction. As we scale to a maximum of 2048
trust labels, the DefuzzicationFunction is generated with a range interval of [0, 10240].
This way, each membership function can cover a range of 5 without overlapping each
other too much. We add Gaussian membership functions with < = (8 ∗ 5) + 2.5 and
f = 1.5, with 8 being the index of the corresponding trust label in the trust enumeration.
An example of this membership function, with a reduced range of [0, 50], is shown in
Figure 8.8. Rules of the FIS are randomly generated in the same way described in the
Setup of Q3.1. The goal is not to generate rules that cover every possible membership
function of the DefuzzicationFunction, but only to generate a functioning FIS that can
be evaluated to a trust label. As the FIS of our running example has three inputs with
three membership functions each, we generate 27 rules, covering every combination of the
membership functions. The input values of the InformationService are randomly chosen
within the range of the randomly created FuzzycationFunctions.
The remaining data ow model is based on our running example of Chapter 5. For an
enumeration to be regarded in the mapping to Prolog, it needs to be assigned to a Trust-
edCharacteristicType. We create a new TrustedCharacteristicType, with the ’Location’
enumeration of the running example as type and the generated trust enumeration as trust.
We set a randomly chosen location label as the value and the newly created TrustedChar-
acteristicType as type of the single TrustedCharacteristic and assign it to each actor. In our
running example, we only use the forward behavior template so that the node behavior
can remain unchanged.























The last question regarding scalability focuses on the time required to map the model to
Prolog code, depending on the number of dierent types of properties used for access
control. We utilize the data ow model of our running example as a base. For each increase
in properties, we add a duplicate of the existing ’Location’ TrustedCharacteristicType.
For each added TrustedCharacteristicType, we duplicate the TrustedCharacteristic, which
are assigned to each actor. We modify these TrustedCharacteristics to be of the added
TrustedCharacteristicType. As the TrustedCharacteristicType is equal to the already
existing one, the TrustedCharacteristics information services and values do not need to
be changed. The node behavior in our running example is only made up of the forward
behavior template so that the behavior can remain unchanged.
8.3 Evaluation Results
In this section, we present and discuss the ndings of our evaluation that was dened in
the previous sections.
8.3.1 Discussion on Applicability
As our evaluation regarding applicability was mostly argumentative, we discuss every
aspect of the corresponding questions and try to come to a conclusion that answers the
question.
Discussion on Q1.1
To answer if the information to apply our proposed concept of trust is available during
design time, we focus on the availability of the information during the very early stages of
the iterative development described in Section 8.2.1.
We reckon that information about sensors and environmental factors can initially be
assumed and rened during the iterative development process. As we have shown with
our running example (see Chapter 5) and the ABAC scenarios (see Section 8.2.2), it is
possible to make some general assumptions about environmental factors from existing
literature. Although the described ABAC scenarios describe a situation where the system
is already deployed, we still came up with the scenarios without using actual run time
details. We only used the existing ABAC DFD model of Seifermann et al. [66] and existing
literature which is exactly what might be available during design time.
More precise measurements, e.g., regarding the signal damping inside the actual buildings,
could be conducted, or technical specications of actually used sensors become available
during the subsequent process. This increasingly more precise knowledge can be used to
rene the calculation of trust in the model. Through the iterative renement of the model,
the results of an analysis using the model can increasingly reect the real-world situation
in which the system is to be deployed.
If the DFD approach of Seifermann et al. [66] is already used to validate system require-
ments regarding access control, our concept of trust can be added once system requirements
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change in a way that makes it necessary to handle this uncertainty. Our approach does
not aim to replace the existing DFD approach but rather represents an optional step that
incorporates more information in order to be able to verify requirements more accurately
to the real world.
Discussion on Q1.2
To answer whether our concept of trust adds value for already deployed systems, we
discuss the availability of information and describe a what-if scenario, which showcases
that issues that result from changes in trust can be identied.
The handling of uncertainty we propose with our concept of trust relies on information
regarding the service used to get access control properties. In order to calculate the trust in
a service, there needs to be knowledge about the source, e.g., sensors and the environmental
factors that inuence the service. During run time, this information is already present. This
enables the software architect to create a very detailed model representation of the system,
which includes our concept of trust. These detailed models can be used to investigate the
impact of changes from what-if scenarios on the access control of the deployed systems
before implementing them.
The ABAC use case, we have described in Section 8.2.2 presents a situation where using
our concept of trust is especially worthwhile for deployed systems.
In the described situation, changes in the environmental factors do not introduce new
potential issues with condentiality but rather introduce usability issues. Changes to the
database used for country geolocation aect the usability of the banking service deployed
in Hong Kong. The accuracy in resolving the country geolocation from the IP addresses
of the actors in Hong Kong decreases drastically due to the change. With the reduced
accuracy, the location property is not always properly set to Hong Kong. As a result,
the access control system, which is in place, might block most data ows to the actors,
eectively locking them out of accessing the Hong Kong customer storage. The original
DFD approach of Seifermann et al. [66] is not able to identify this issue, as the information
about the databases that are used to resolve IP addresses to geolocations is not taken into
account.
With our concept of trust, this information is added to the DFD representation of the
system. The changes to the database result in lower trust in the location property and
therefore enable the analysis to identify the issue beforehand, preserving the usability of
deployed systems.
Discussion on Q1.3
As we have described in Section 2.3 and 6.1, we use fuzzy inference systems to describe
calculation rules to utilize multiple dierent inputs and derive a trust value. To evaluate
whether FISs are suitable for the proposed use, we focus on the knowledge required to
create, understand and extend a FIS:
In the book "Fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic: theory and applications," George Klir and Bo
Yuan [39] address signicant topics of fuzzy set theory and fuzzy logic, including fuzzy
inference systems. They describe that through fuzzication, an enhanced ability to model
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real-world problems is gained, lowering overall solution cost. The use of fuzziness also
serves to achieve "greater capability to capture human common-sense reasoning, decision
making, and other aspects of human cognition [39, pages 32f.]."
When setting up a calculation rule in general, the system’s properties and environment are
abstracted and simplied. As a result, information about the inputs and their inuence on
the result is lost. A FIS conserves more knowledge about the inputs and their inuence on
the calculated trust value than a conventional mathematical function by mapping inputs
to membership functions and working with natural language concepts.
Additionally, a FIS "has the capability to capture and deal with meanings of sentences
expressed in natural language [39, pages 32f.]," which enables, e.g., a software architect
or security expert to more easily map statements or requirements about the inuence
of environmental factors on trust, to calculation rules. The additional knowledge, easy-
to-understand linguistic concepts, and captured human decision-making allow for more
informed changes or extensions to the calculation rule. Fuzzy control and fuzzy decision-
making are also already relevant topics in industrial engineering. Domain experts that
are involved in the creation process might already be familiar with the concept of fuzzy
control/inference.
However, the quality and accuracy of the knowledge contained in a FIS depends heavily
on the ability to create appropriate membership functions. As the membership functions
capture linguistic concepts, their denition can be vague and context-dependent. This
makes it hard to dene meaningful membership functions. George Klir and Bo Yuan
address this topic by describing various methods to create membership functions that
carry appropriate meaning, given their context. These methods include direct and indirect
methods involving one or more experts, as well as the creation of membership functions
based on sample data [39, pages 280.]. These methods make it possible to iteratively create
and increase the quality of the membership functions for the environmental factor inputs
and trust output of our proposed FIS. Although the ability to iteratively create and improve
the quality of the membership functions integrates well with the iterative nature of the
development process (see Section 8.2.1), the methods described are rather cumbersome,
time-intensive, and require good input of data or expert knowledge. However, while the
initial eort to create such FISs may be higher, their understandability and extensibility
make them a viable option in their proposed use.
Discussion on Q1.4
To answer if the expressiveness of the original DFD approach of Seifermann et al. [66]
is aected by the addition of our concept of trust, we evaluate the expressiveness of
our extended DFD approach in the same way it was done for the original approach and
compare results.
To evaluate the expressiveness of their approach regarding access control, Seifermann et
al. [66] dene two questions:




• Are the proposed analysis semantics capable of dening analyses of access control
violations?
To answer these questions, they select six known use cases, three of which represent the
RBAC model and are taken from previous work [65]. The three remaining represent the
common access control models DAC, MAC and ABAC. By creating instances of these use
cases using the original DFD syntax, they answer the rst question.
We can answer the rst question in the same way, by using the default trust approach, we
have also used to answer question Q2.1 in Section 8.2.2. We modify the DFD instances
of Seifermann et al. to use our extended DFD while still representing the identical use
case. The default trust approach adds our concept of trust to a DFD instance but does
not change the semantic of the DFD instance, eectively emulating a DFD without trust
labels. Table 8.1 gives an overview of the size of the DFD instance for each use case. To
Case Nodes Edges Behaviors Characteristic Types Labels
TravelPlanner 17 19 8 2 3
DistanceTracker 8 9 6 2 3
ContacSMS 9 12 7 2 3
DAC 7 7 6 4 4
MAC 15 22 7 2 3
ABAC 13 18 6 4 6
Table 8.1: Metrics of access control cases realized in the original DFD syntax used to
evaluate expressiveness [66].
answer their second question, Seifermann et al. [66] dene Prolog queries for each use
case. The query for a use case can be used with the result of the transformation of the
corresponding DFD instance. As we have only slightly modied the transformation to
Prolog to handle our trust labels, we can replicate the queries almost exactly. Instead of
the original nodeCharacteristic and characteristic facts, we use the corre-
sponding facts we have extended with a trust label (see Section 7.2).
Being able to answer both questions in the same way as the original DFD approach suggests,
that adding our concept of trust to the DFD and analysis did not impact the expressiveness.
The added concept of trust, on the other hand, enables properties to incorporate informa-
tion about environmental factors. This allows for more ne granular denition of access
control properties and rules. The original approach allows for
∏ℎ0A)~?4B
#E0;D4! possible
property combinations, where CharTypes is the set of characteristic types, #value is the
number of value labels of the characteristic type. Including trust increases the number of
possible combinations to
∏)ADBC43ℎ0A)~?4B
#E0;D4#CADBC !, where TrustedCharTypes is the set
of trusted characteristic types, #value is the number of value labels of the characteristic
type and #trust is the number of trust labels of the characteristic type.
A similar result could be archived by implementing many ne granular property hierar-
chies. However, these properties would mix the semantics of the original property with the
semantics of trust, making them less comprehensible. Through trust, the environmental
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factors have a direct eect on the expressive power of the corresponding property, gen-
erally increasing the expressiveness of our approach, compared to the original approach
from Seifermann et al. [66].
8.3.2 Findings and Discussion on Accuracy
In this section, we present and discuss our ndings regarding the accuracy of our extended
analysis. We calculate the proposed precision and recall metrics based on the ndings of
each question and briey discuss the meaning of the values of both metrics.
Findings on Q2.1
We executed the model instances for the S0 and S1 scenarios of every use case we have
described in Section 8.2.2. We correctly did not identify an issue in the six S0 scenarios,
which contain no issue. For the six corresponding S1 scenarios, we were able to identify
the contained issues correctly. Table 8.2 shows the number of issues introduced to each
use case to form S1 scenarios, compared to the number of these issues we were able to
identify.
For our described metrics the number of identied issues in the S1 scenarios represent
the true positive value C? = 6. We did not identify non existing issues in the S0 scenarios
resulting in the false positive value of 5? = 0. This results in a precision of ? =
6
6+0 = 1.0.
As shown in Table 8.2, we did not miss any of the introduced issues in the S1 scenarios,
so the false negative value amounts to 5= = 0. This results in a recall of A =
6









Table 8.2: Evaluated metrics for Q2.1.
we have described, our S1 scenarios and queries are semantically equal to the scenarios
that were dened by Seifermann et al. when evaluating the accuracy of the original DFD
approach [66]. When comparing our results to the results of Seifermann et al., we can see,
that the addition of our concept of trust did not impact the ability of the DFD approach
to correctly identify access control issues, that result from mismatched properties. This
shows, that while we extend the ability of the DFD approach to represent and identify




For question Q2.2 we only base our evaluation of accuracy on the ABAC use case, described
in Section 8.2.2. We divided the S2 scenario in the two sub-scenarios S2.1 and S2.2. S2.1
introduces a trust issue regarding the role property. S2.2 introduces a trust issue regarding
the location property. We correctly did not identify an issue in the corresponding S0
scenario, which contains no issue. For the scenarios S2.1 and S2.2, we where able to
correctly identify the introduced issue.
We calculate the metrics similarly to how they are calculated for the ndings on Q2.1. The
number of correctly identied issues in the S2 scenarios is C? = 2. We did not identify non
existing issues in the S0 scenarios and did not miss any of the two introduced issues, so
the false positive value amounts to 5? = 0 and the false negative value amounts to 5= = 0.
This results in a precision of ? = 2
2+0 = 1.0 and a recall of A =
2
2+0 = 1.0
We did expect similar results, as property issues and trust issues both result from mis-
matched labels. In our approach, the way trust labels are compared is equal to how the
normal property labels are compared. Bad accuracy for S1 scenarios should result in bad
accuracy in S2 scenarios and vice versa.
However, as we were not able to dene equivalence classes for the entirety of trust issues
and test them individually, there can exist situations where this might not be the case.
Findings on Q2.3
For question Q2.3 we combine the S1 scenario of the ABAC use case with the S2.1 scenario
to form a single S3 scenario.
As in the ndings on Q2.1 and Q2.2, we correctly did not identify an issue in the corre-
sponding S0 scenario. In the S3 scenario, we can exclusively identify the three issues that
correspond to the S1 scenario and the single issue that corresponds to the S2.1 scenario.
As we only use one S3 scenario, the calculation of metrics is trivial. The precision and
recall are ? = 1.0 and A = 1.0.
We did expect similar results, as the analysis is already able to identify issues from mis-
matched properties and trust independently. As we use the same query that was used
for the ABAC situations of Q2.1 and Q2.2, solutions that were found for Q2.1 can still be
found, and solutions that were found for Q2.2 can still be found, eectively creating the
union of both results.
8.3.3 Findings and Discussion on Scalability
In this section, we present and discuss our ndings regarding the scalability of the trans-
formation from DFD to Prolog. In each question, we scale a dierent aspect of the model,
which we added as part of the contribution of this thesis. The measured execution times
are gathered and plotted to give a better visual representation of the prevalent execution




We divided our results regarding Q3.1 into the generation of the s le and the execution of
the FIS. Both combined make up our process of calculating a trust label from environmental
factors. Our ndings are plotted, and the results are shown in Figures 8.9.
Figure 8.9a shows the time needed to generate the s le. With an increasing number
of environmental factors, i.e., the inputs to the FIS, we can identify a tipping point in
generation time at 32 environmental factors. At this point, the nearly constant generation
time behavior changes to linear behavior.
The execution time behavior of the FIS, shown in Figure 8.9b, shows exponential growth
behavior with an increase of environmental factors. While the generation of the s le has
been fully implemented by us, we rely on third-party fuzzy inference libraries to execute
the actual FIS, in our case FuzzyLite [56]. Utilizing libraries from other parties might result
in varying execution time behavior. Additionally, when focusing on the actual median
times of the highest iteration of our testing, we can see that the time needed to generate
the s le still is higher than the actual execution time of the associated FIS. This makes
the generation of the s le the dominant factor in the process of executing a FIS model
instance with a high number of inputs. If the generation and execution time continue to
grow with the observed behavior, this might change for FISs with even more inputs.
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(a) Times needed to generate s le from FIS
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(b) Times needed to execute a s le and calcu-
lating trust label, with increasing number of
inputs.
Figure 8.9: Findings on Q3.1.
However, we believe that over 2000 environmental factors are far beyond the number
of environmental factors that might be modeled during design time. With our approach,
each factor would require multiple membership functions. While membership functions
might be created using sample data (see Section 8.3.1), extensive rules that utilize them as
inputs sill would need to be created by hand. We reckon that due to the extensive eort
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involved, information services with more than 128 environmental factors will be seldom,
and most will have far less. This results in a combined time for executing a FIS of mostly
less than 23 ms, which is an almost negligible inuence on the general running time.
Findings on Q3.2
The times needed for the transformation to and generation of the Prolog code, with an
increasing number of information services and properties, are shown in Figure 8.10.
With an increase in information services and properties, we can identify that the plotted
graph grows exponentially for smaller iterations but transitions into linear growth, be-
ginning at 32 information services. This transition can be traced back to the number of
information services and corresponding constant time to calculate their respective trust
value becoming the dominant factor for the mapping time to Prolog. Regarding the size
of the generated Prolog code, while increasing the number of information services and
properties in a model increases the overall size and complexity of the model instance itself,
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Figure 8.10: Time for the transformation to Prolog code, with increasing number informa-
tion services.
Findings on Q3.3
The times needed to transform model instances with an increasing number of trust labels
to Prolog code are shown in Figure 8.11. Similar to our ndings on Q3.2, we can identify
a point in the plotted graph where the superlinear growth in time transitions to linear
growth. A big dierence to our ndings on Q3.2 is that the size of the trust enumeration
impacts the size of the generate Prolog code radically. This was expected, as each added
label is transformed to its own characteristicTypeTrust(CT, T, I) Prolog
fact, as we describe in Section 7.2. Each additional trust label also adds lines to the
Prolog representation of the behavior of the nodes, as each assignment of each behavior
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adds a characteristic(N, PIN, CT, V, T, S, VF) :- ... rule for each
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Figure 8.11: Time for the transformation to Prolog code, with increasing size of trust
enumeration.
Similar to what we describe in our ndings on Q3.1, we believe that dening over 2000
individual trust values for a single characteristic type is far beyond what might be modeled
during design time. However, as the number of trust labels only inuences the execution
time in a linear manner, even a very ne-grained denition of trust labels should not result
in excessive execution times of the mapping.
Findings on Q3.4
The times needed for the transformation and generation of Prolog code, with an increasing
number of types of properties, are shown in Figure 8.12. Looking at Figure 8.12, we can
identify, that overall the execution time behavior of the transformation to Prolog shows
linear growth when increasing the number of instances of TrustedCharacteristicType.
Similar to our ndings on Q3.3, the size of the Prolog code is impacted radically, as
each instance of TrustedCharacteristicType is transformed to the Prolog facts described
in Listing 7.1. For our setup, with three value labels and three trust labels, each added
TrustedCharacteristicType adds seven additional Prolog facts.
Generally, with the ndings for Q3.2, Q3.3, and Q3.4, we can conclude that the model
aspects we add as part of our approach only inuence the execution time of the mapping
to Prolog in a linear manner. We believe that this linear inuence will not negatively
impact the overall execution time behavior of the original mapping to Prolog. The original
mapping also increases the size of the mapped Prolog code for each additional model










































Figure 8.12: Time for the transformation to Prolog code, with an increasing number of
types of properties.
8.4 Threats to Validity
As the evaluation of our approach is partly evaluated with case studies, we discuss the
internal validity, external validity, construct validity, and reliability of our contribution, as
characterized by Runeson, Höst, Austen, and Regnell [61].
As our evaluation goals are structured in applicability, accuracy, and scalability, we discuss
our threads to validity for each of our goals separately.
Internal validity ensures that causal relations are valid, i.e., the factor that is expected to
have an inuence is the only inuencing factor.
The main threat to the internal validity of our evaluation of applicability is whether or
not our chosen questions and discussed results hold enough weight to make a proper
statement about applicability. The discussed additional value of our contribution for run
time systems in question Q1.2 highly depends on the system and its area of application.
However, as we have discussed in the evaluation, we still were able to create multiple
problematic real-world situations, using actual values of environmental factors taken
from existing literature. This also mitigates the thread regarding Q1.1, as we were able to
identify applicable environmental factors for various situations from existing literature,
using only the described use cases as a base.
As the setup of our evaluation of accuracy is strongly based on the evaluation of the DFD
approach of Seifermann et al. [66], the same factors that inuence the internal validity
still hold: Analysis queries or DFDs that are incorrect can still yield the expected result,
which might be an identied violation or not. We address this issue by dening three
distinct types of issues in our S1, S2, and S3 scenarios as well as the corresponding S0
scenarios without issues and analyze them with the same query. Queries that are overly
customized to nd a specic issue, e.g., by encoding the violation that is to be identied
directly in the query, can positively impact the accuracy. To combat this threat, we use
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the same queries for the evaluation of Q2.1 that have been used by Seifermann et al.. To
avoid these overtted queries, for questions Q2.2 and Q2.3, we extend the access control
query of the ABAC use case to directly take our concept of trust into account and use this
distinct query to evaluate the three situation pairs of questions Q2.2 and Q2.3. A threat to
the internal validity of our scalability evaluation using dierent base models instances for
each scaled aspect of a model. Some base model setups can positively impact the execution
time on some test cases because they omit the parts of the transformation algorithm that
are impacted by the scaled aspect of the model. Also, using dierent base model instances
makes it impossible to properly compare the resulting execution time behavior of dierent
scaled model aspects. To combat this threat, we use the same model instance as a base
for Q3.2, Q3.3, and Q3.4 of our scalability evaluation. With a uniform base, the inuence
of the remaining aspects of the model remains constant and does not aect the overall
observed behavior. We also focus on a single aspect for each question, explicitly only
scaling the model elements necessary for the scaled model aspect to be taken into account
by the transformation algorithm.
External validity ensures that the ndings are only generalized if they can validly be
applied to other situations, groups, or events.
For our evaluation of applicability, a threat to validity is the author’s bias towards his own
contribution and his own limited experience regarding real-world access control setups.
However, we base most of our statements on existing literature. Moreover, our evaluation
of applicability already contains a discussion about external validity, as the proposition
of applicability already covers how far something can be generalized or holds value for
others.
The main threat to external validity of our accuracy evaluation stems from the small
number of S2 and S3 scenarios we cover when answering questions Q2.2 and Q2.3. As
we have discussed multiple times throughout this thesis, at the time of writing this thesis,
there is little existing literature that describes use cases that cover all details that are
necessary to apply our concept. This lack of usable information makes it impossible to
derive meaningful equivalence classes for trust and evaluate the accuracy of our analysis
in nding issues with trust in a structured way. We still try to partly mitigate this thread by
dening our S2 and S3 scenarios using real-world environmental factors and measurements
from exiting literature to create appropriate use cases, removing our bias towards using
solely made-up values that positively inuence the accuracy. Additionally, the S2 and S3
scenarios are based on the ABAC use case of Seifermann et al. [66]. As we have described
in Chapter 4, our concept of trust is based around the idea of trust relationships and
attribute assurance, described in the NIST publication dening ABAC [31], [32]. By adding
our concept of trust to the ABAC use case, we can show that we are not only able to
represent but also accurately identify issues in trust chains during design time, as well as
analyze whether the availability of appropriate attributes is assured.
Another threat to external validity are the selected accuracy values we base the setup of
question Q2.2 on. We take the geolocation accuracy values for the S2.2 scenario from the
publications [25], [54], [69]. The geolocation database data used by these publications is
from 2016 or older. According to the statement on the website of MaxMind-GeoLite [45],
their databases are updated weekly. As we have no way of reevaluating the results of our
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referenced publications with current databases, the problem described in this setup might
not exist anymore or be less drastic than described. However, the described situation still
presented an issue in 2016, and issues of a similar nature might still occur.
Construct validity assures that our selected metrics can answer our research questions
and that the questions contribute to the dened evaluation goals. For our metrics, we chose
a discussion to rate applicability, precision, and recall to rate accuracy and the execution
time to rate scalability. Using metrics to summarize the applicability of an approach is not
suciently possible, as the applicability is generally very dependent on variations and
limitations of the actual system an approach is applied at. We still discuss the applicability
during two general phases of software development, design time and run time, which
every production system undergoes. The included discussion about expressiveness is
fully based on the evaluation of the original DFD approach our contribution is based on.
Consequently, we share the same threads to validity, which have already been discussed
by Seifermann et al. [66].
The precision and recall metrics are common for evaluating accuracy and are used evaluate
related work [4], [66].
Measuring the execution time for tasks with increasing size and discussing the observed
execution time behavior is also a common way to evaluate the scalability. Especially for
approaches in the domain of system architecture modeling, where the formulated problems
can vary in size drastically, for example [27]. In our evaluation of scalability, we only
focus on the mapping of DFD instances to Prolog code and not the actual execution of
an analysis by running a query on the resulting Prolog code. As we have already briey
discussed in Section 8.1.3, the execution time of the Prolog code depends on other factors
that are more closely related to the original DFD approach of Seifermann et al. [66] than
to our approach of this thesis, like the general structure of the data ow diagram instance,
the kind of executed query, the Prolog library and optimization techniques that were used.
As we only base the implementation of our approach on the DFD approach of Seifermann
et al., we believe that evaluating the impact of these more general factors on the scalability
of running the analysis is out of scope for this thesis.
Reliability assures that other researchers can repeat the evaluation and come to the same
results. As discussed before, our discussion regarding applicability is based on existing
literature. Still, our discussion but might still leave room for further interpretation, which
is an issue we can not directly address. To mitigate any remaining threads regarding the
reliability of our evaluation, we publish our implementation and model extension as well
as all model instances of every analyzed scenario in our data set [9]. This allows others to
reproduce the results of our accuracy and scalability evaluation.
8.5 Assumptions and Limitations
We distinguish between our assumptions and limitations of our proposed concept of trust,
as well as of our evaluation:
Regarding our concept of trust, we make some assumptions regarding the environmental
factors and their inuence in the calculation of trust. Generally, we assume that developers
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have to know which environmental factors inuence trust of a service or have a process of
identifying environmental factors and their corresponding inuence on trust. While adding
newly emerging environmental factors to the calculation can be done with little eort,
as we have discussed in Section 8.3.1, knowledge about the environmental factors has to
already exists. We also assume that all environmental factors are quantiable and can be
taken into account by the trust calculation. Additionally, linguistic concepts or membership
functions for environmental factors have to already exist, or it is always possible to apply
one of the processes described in Section 8.3.1 to derive tting membership functions, i.e.,
either expert knowledge or sample data exists and can be used.
A limitation of our approach is that there is no way to draw conclusions based on a
trust label about which exact environmental factors of which InformationService have
led to the trust label. Dierent information services can provide the same property, e.g.,
a location in a building, but be inuenced by dierent environmental factors and in
dierent ways. The characteristics associated with these information services have the
same characteristic type, which makes the, e.g., location properties and trust comparable
with each other. It is therefore not necessarily possible to tell based on a trust label from
which InformationService it originated and thus which exact environmental factors had
which inuence.
We make two assumptions in our evaluation that do not directly pose a threat to validity
but need mentioning for the sake of completeness:
For our evaluation, we assume that the architectural model always describes the software
or run time system adequately. For our approach, this means that the model includes the
correct specications for every information service and that changes in the software or
run time system are correctly propagated to the model. If this is not the case, transferring
conclusions from an analysis based on the model to the software or runtime system could
lead to errors.
With existing approaches which use system monitoring data to align architectural models
with the run time system, such as iObserve [27], this assumption could be achieved with
less eort.
8.6 Data Availability
All data of this thesis is made publicly available in our data set [9]. We include our data ow
diagram extension, extended Prolog transformation algorithm, and all test implementations




To conclude this thesis, we summarize our contribution in Section 9.1 and give an outlook
on future work in Section 9.2. Finally, we express our acknowledgments in Section 9.3.
9.1 Summary
In this thesis, we proposed our approach to handle uncertainty in access control during
design time. We dened a characterization of uncertainties in access control on the archi-
tectural level to provide a better understanding of the kinds of uncertainty that can be
present. By dening our concept of trust, we raise awareness about existing uncertainty,
enabling the handling of the corresponding uncertainty. Adding additional information to
design time software architecture models and providing a way to analyze model instances
for access control violations enables software architects to further increase the quality of
models and verify requirements regarding access control under uncertainty in the early
stages of the software development process.
We dened our concept of trust as a composition of environmental factors, e.g., environ-
mental conditions of nature, age of information, and used hardware of a modeled system,
that impact the validity of and consequently trust in access control properties. To combine
the environmental factors, we proposed the use of fuzzy inference systems as a way of
calculating trust values for access control properties.
We extended the existing DFD approach of Seifermann et al. [66] to design time information
ow and access control analysis. The existing approach uses a transformation algorithm to
map instances of a DFD metamodel to a Prolog logic program and uses queries to analyze
the DFD and detect violations. Access control properties are represented by labels, which
are propagated along the ow of data. We extended the existing DFD metamodel by explic-
itly representing services that supply access control properties. Each information service
has a trust associated with them, which dierent environmental factors can inuence in
dierent ways. To describe how environmental factors are mapped to trust values, we
proposed the use of fuzzy inference systems as a way of dening calculation rules. We
introduced trust labels as a way of representing trust in the DFD metamodel. We further
extended the existing transformation to Prolog by adding additional label propagation
logic for our trust labels.
In our evaluation, we discussed the overall applicability of our proposed concept of trust.
Using manually created scenarios and values for environmental factors we extract from
existing literature, we showed that our concept of trust can generally be applied to system
models during design and run time of the system. We also showed that there can be
situations even after the system has already been deployed where the addition of our
concept of trust to the system model provides additional value. We show that our use of
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FISs as a way of dening a mapping from environmental factors to a trust value makes it
more natural for humans to dene these kinds of calculation rules and holds additional
information, which aids in the extensibility of existing FISs. Additionally, we compared the
expressiveness of the existing DFD approach in representing systems and dening analyses
for access control, with and without our extension, which showed that our extension did
not impact expressiveness.
We also evaluated the accuracy of our approach in correctly identifying access control
issues. We dened three classes of issues that result in an access control issue and showed
that our approach could correctly identify each issue. Finally, for our evaluation, we
observed the execution time behavior of the mapping from DFD to Prolog. We scaled the
size of the model aspects that were added by our approach. This showed that even for
large systems with very detailed trust denitions, the mapping to Prolog only exhibits
linear execution time behavior.
9.2 Future Work
While working on this thesis, we identied three points of future work.
One of the biggest obstacles throughout the work on the thesis was the poor supply
of publications dealing with similar problems that could be applied to our contribution.
Further research regarding real-world scenarios or use cases regarding access control
properties and uncertainty could improve the quality of the evaluation of applicability and
accuracy of our approach. Additionally, this would not only help to provide a better base
for other publications in this eld but could also help to better identify and address actual
real-world issues.
Our contribution still requires the software architect to create the Prolog query data ow
constraints by hand and have knowledge about the structure of the Prolog program that
results from the transformation of a DFD instance. Similar to our contribution, the data
ow constraints approach of Hahner et al. [26] is also integrated with the DFD approach
of Seifermann et al. [66]. The use of the domain-specic language (DSL) for modeling data
ow constraints would simplify the process of dening constraints and reduce the need to
know details about the actual mapping to Prolog.
While working on this thesis, we presented our approach in the context of a meeting of
the members of the FluidTrust research project [28]. The following discussion centered
around the FISs and the possibility of applying machine learning to increase the quality of
the FISs overall.
For the membership functions of the inputs and outputs of the FISs, there are already
existing approaches that utilize sample data [39, 290.], which could be adapted to machine
learning. However, while it conceptually should be possible to create the rules for a FIS of
an InformationService using machine learning, some major problems and limitations need
to be considered. As an InformationService can generally supply any kind of property
for the access control model, the data required to learn rules might be dierent for each
kind of property. This is a problem, as machine learning is very dependent on the amount
of available and prepared data. Additionally, if a new environmental factor is added to a
FIS, the whole rule set needs to be relearned completely, eliminating the normally easy
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extensibility of a FIS. While the described problems exist, the possibility of using machine
learning with our contribution should be further researched.
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